Insurance Consequences of Adverse Drug Reactions by Olster, Bruce A.
Volume 79 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 79, 
1974-1975 
3-1-1975 
Insurance Consequences of Adverse Drug Reactions 
Bruce A. Olster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce A. Olster, Insurance Consequences of Adverse Drug Reactions, 79 DICK. L. REV. 401 (1975). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol79/iss3/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 





The problem of interpreting the accident provision in both
double indemnity clauses of life insurance policies and health and
accident insurance policies has beleagured the courts for many
decades.' Justice Musmanno speaking for the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Brenneman v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.2
stated:
What is an accident? Everyone knows until the word
comes up in court. Then it becomes a mysterious phenom-
enon, and, in order to resolve the engima, witnesses are
summoned, experts testify, lawyers argue, treatises are
consulted and even when a conclave of twelve world-
knowledgeable individuals agree as to whether a certain set
of facts made out an accident, the question may not yet
be settled and it must be reheard in an appellate court.
3
In recent years, the use of therapeutic drugs in the treatment
of disease has increased many fold and, due to the extensive medical
research which is required by law before a drug may be used by
the public, the possibility of a patient suffering an adverse reaction
is minimized. Unfortunately, however, patients do not always react
as expected because of an unknown hypersensitivity to a particular
drug and, as a result, death may ensue. Such a reaction is medi-
cally referred to as anaphylactic shock.
4
1. See Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 225 A.2d 532
(1967); Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511,
193 A.2d 217 (1963); 10 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsURANcE LAW §§ 41.5-
41.38 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1962) [hereinafter cited as COUcH]; R. KEETON,
BASIC TEXT ON INsuRANcE LAW § 5.4 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KEETON];
W. MEYER, LIE AND HEALTH INsURANcE LAW §§ 14.1-14.2 (1968) [herein-
after cited as MEYER].
2. 411 Pa. 409, 192 A.2d 745 (1963).
3. Id. at 412, 413, 192 A.2d at 747.
4. Anaphylaxis is defined as, "[a]n unusual or exaggerated reaction
Typically, the insured suffers from a minor ailment which in
the course of a routine medical procedure requires the administra-
tion of a drug into his system. However, due to a particular hyper-
sensitivity or idiosyncrasy to the specific drug the insured suffers
a fatal result.5 Sometimes the effects occur immediately while in
other instances the insured has a delayed reaction, but in any event
neither the physician nor the patient knew or even suspected the
hypersensitivity of the insured to the drug.0 In fact it is generally
impossible to predict which patients will suffer the adverse reaction
to a particular drug.7 The only common element among the various
drugs which originate the anaphylactic shock cases is the infre-
quency with which the drugs induce the unexpected results.8
This Comment examines the effect of the "accident" provision
and other related clauses in insurance contracts on the ability of
the beneficiary to recover where the insured has suffered the un-
fortunate consequences of an unexpected and unforeseen allergic
reaction to a drug. A detailed analysis on a jurisdictional basis
is made delineating those cases where recovery was or was not per-
mitted under accident insurance policies or double indemnity
clauses of life insurance policies. It is the purpose of this Comment
to analyze and classify the theories upon which these cases have
permitted recovery, and in addition to trace the history and de-
velopment of these theories with a noted interest in presently de-
veloping trends.
Consideration is not given to those cases where an incident such
as an automobile collision or a fall down the stairs, which are uni-
formly held to be accidents, precedes the administration of the drug
to the insured. In such instances the beneficiary is compensated
based on the original accident.9 The only accident in the anaphy-
of the organism to foreign protein or other substances." W. DORLAND, MED-
IcAL DicTIoNARY 78 (24th ed. 1965).
5. While the cases considered herein involve fatal results, it should
be noted that anaphylactic shock is not always fatal. See generally
Nosaquo, Reactions to Contrast Media, 91 RADIOLOGY 92 (1968).
6. H. Pendergrass, Tondreau, E. Pendergrass, Ritchie, Hildreth, and
Askovitz, Reactions Associated with Intravenous Urography; Historical and
Statistical Review, 71 RADIOLOGY 1 (1958).
7. Hildreth, H. Pendergrass, Tondreau, and Ritchie, Reactions As-
sociated with Intravenous Urography: Discussion of Mechanisms and Ther-
apy, 74 RADIOLOGY 246, 249 (1960).
8. Id.
9. See Gyulai v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 135 Pa.
Super. 73, 4 A.2d 824 (1938). In this case a board struck the insured on
the head which subsequently required the administration of a drug to effect
medical treatment. The insured had a hypersensitivity to the drug which
resulted in his death. The court reasoned that the accident, namely the hit
on the head, started a chain of events which led to his death and therefore,
even if death would not have resulted solely from the original injury recov-
ery would still be permitted. Id. at 78, 82, 4 A.2d at 825.
See 10 CoucH § 41.30; Note, The Effects of a Pre-Existing Disease on
the Right to Recover Under an Accident Policy or The Double Indemnity
Provision of a Life Insurance Policy, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 853 (1938).
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lactic shock cases examined in this article is the mistaken application
of the drug to the unknowingly hypersensitive insured who is not
being treated by reason of any accident of the type just described.
In addition it is assumed for purposes of this Comment that the drug
was properly prescribed and properly administered to the insured.
II. INSURANCE CONTRACTS
A. The Relevant Clauses
The courts in anaphylactic shock cases have been concerned
with the construction of the two types of insurance contracts: the
life insurance policy and the health and accident policy. There are
four clauses within these types of policies that courts have in vary-
ing degrees considered essential to the proper disposition of an ana-
phylactic shock case.
The first and most important is a clause which requires the
injury or death of the insured to be the result of an accident.10
In anaphylactic shock cases the clause most frequently encountered
protects the insured from "bodily injuries effected through acci-
dental means."" The issue then confronting the court is whether
anaphylactic shock is death by accidental means. This specific
language is employed by the insurance companies to limit their lia-
bility to only those instances where the cause or the means of the
injury were accidental. 12 It is their intent by the use of this lan-
guage not to be held liable where only an unexpected result oc-
curred from the use of voluntary and intentionally employed
means.13 Because anaphylactic shock is merely an unexpected re-
sult from the proper use of an intended drug a strict interpretation
of this definition would require a court to deny recovery to the
beneficiary. However, the various jurisdictions are divided on
whether such an interpretation as propounded by insurance counsel
should be given to the term "accidental means."'1 4 The division
10. It is assumed that there is a connection between the injection of
the drug and the adverse reaction. Generally, insurance contracts also re-
quire the injury to be caused by external and violent means, but this has
not been an issue in anaphylactic shock cases. See 10 CoucH §§ 41.39-41.41.
11. Other clauses such as caused by accident or accidental death have
been employed, but except in one instance have not been the concern of
cases on anaphylactic shock. See Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Co., 39
P.2d 733 (Utah 1935); note 98 infra.
12. E.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491,
496 (1933) ; KEr.ON § 5.4(e).
13. Id.
14. E.g., Beckham v. Travelers Insurance Company, 424 Pa. 107, 225
A.2d 532 (1967); Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40
which has arisen in defining this term is the essence of the split
of authority which presently exists in cases on anaphylactic shock.
The second clause conditioning the liability of the insurance
company requires the accident to be the sole and independent cause
of the insured's death.15 The issue which is often raised under this
clause is whether the insured's hypersensitivity to the drug was
a concurring or contributing cause of his death. Insurance com-
pany counsel argue that even if there was an accident in giving
the drug to the insured his death would not have occurred without
the hypersensitivity and therefore the accident itself was not the
"sole and independent" cause of the insured's death.16 In consider-
ing this issue courts have treated synonymously the issue presented
by the third clause, namely, whether the hypersensitivity of the
insured constitutes a bodily disease or infirmity which contributed
to his death.17 While some older decisions are to the contrary, a
mere hypersensitivity to a particular drug is generally not held to
be a bodily infirmity or a contributing cause of death.
1 8
The fourth clause germane to recovery in these cases is an
exclusionary clause which refers to injuries effected through medi-
N.J. 511, 193 A.2d 217 (1963); 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1221 (1969); 10
Couch §§ 41.23-41.30; KELTON § 5.4(e); MEsms § 14.2.
15. See, e.g., 10 COUCH § 41.32; KELrON § 5.4(e). It should also be
noted that often the phrases direct result or direct and independent cause
are used, but they have been treated similarly.
It is often important to distinguish between those insurance contracts
which protect the insured from, "bodily injury, solely through external, vio-
lent, and accidental means . . ." and those which in addition have the
phrase, "resulting directly and independently of all other causes ......
Under the former the accident must merely start a chain of events leading
to the insured's death, while in the later the accident must be the only cause
of death. However, this issue has never arisen in the context of anaphylac-
tic shock. See Dickerson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 158 Pa. Super.
596, '599, 46 A.2d 33, 34 (1946); Mawn v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
144 Pa. Super. 200, 205, 206, 19 A.2d 300, 302 (1941); Clime v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 50 Pa. D. & C. 433 (C.P. Bucks County, 1944).
16. E.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55,
59 (8th Cir. 1932); Hesse v. Travelers Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125, 129, 130, 149
A. 96, 97 (1930).
17. While most jurisdictions interpret the contract the same whether
or not the exclusionary clause for bodily infirmities is present, Pennsylvania
decisions make a distinction where only the sole and independent cause pro-
vision is present. Real Eqtate Trust Co. of Philadelphia, Trustee v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co., 340 Pa. 533, 17 A.2d 416 (1941). See note 242
and accompanying text infra.
18. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486, 489 (4th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925); Berkowitz v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 10 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1939); Taylor v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929); Vollrath v. Central Life
Ins. Co., 243 Ill. App. 181 (1929). But cf. Order of United Commercial Trav-
elers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55, 59 (8th Cir. 1932); Hesse v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
299 Pa. 125, 129, 130, 146 A. 96, 97 (1930).
The leading case on defining what constitutes a bodily infirmity is Sil-
verstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930). Sil-
verstein which is adopted by many jurisdictions on this definition cites with
approval the Dodge and Taylor cases.
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cal treatment.19 It is very rarely an issue in anaphylactic shock
cases but nevertheless it has been held to defeat recovery in the
few instances it has been considered.2 0
B. Common Principles Used in the Interpretation of Insurance
Policies
In the construction of specific clauses such as those noted in
the previous section the courts have adhered to various principles
that are common to the interpretation of all insurance policies.2
First and most important is the principle that an insurance policy
is a contract.22 The various interpretive tools commonly used by
the courts in construing contracts are thereby called into play. The
courts' objective, as with any contract, is to determine the intent
of the parties at the time the contract was made.23 Another com-
mon contract principle used in interpreting insurance policies is
that the court is confined to interpreting only the express terms
of the contract. 24 As it is often stated in insurance cases, "courts
cannot make contracts for parties. They can only enforce the con-
tract which the parties themselves have made.'
25
Similarly, in determining the parties' intent it is the general
rule that the language of the policy must be read as a whole.
26
Therefore, the construction of a specific clause which would defeat
the overall intent of the parties must be rejected.27 Where the
terms of the insurance contract are unambiguous by definition they
19. The typical clause excludes any loss, "resulting directly or indi-
rectly from medical or surgical treatment for any kind of disease." Wilson
v. Travelers Insurance Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 312, 313, 287 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782
(1968).
20. E.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55
(8th Cir. 1932); International Travelers Ass'n v. Yates, 29 S.W.2d 980 (Texas
Ct. App. 1930). See note 218 infra.
21. It is of course the inherent nature of insurance contracts once con-
strued that recovery will be denied if only one provision is not fulfilled
or one exception to the contract realized. Therefore, if a court finds
anaphylactic shock is not accidental means it need not proceed any further
to deny recovery. If the court holds to the contrary, recovery will only
be permitted when the other provisions of the contract are also fulfilled
and none of the exceptions are realized.
22. 1 CoucH § 15.
23. Id. §§ 15.9, 15.10. The fact most insurance contracts are standard
forms does not alter the status of the policy as a voluntary contract between
the parties. Id. § 15.6.
24. 1 Coucs §§ 15.9, 15.10, 15.37.
25. Sellars v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 30 F.2d 42, 45 (4th Cir. 1929);
1 COUCH § 15.37.
26. 1 COUCH § 15.29.
27. Id. § 15.9.
indicate the intent of the parties, and the court cannot, under the
guise of judicial construction, expand or diminish the risks ex-
pressly covered by the policy.
28
The second principle of construction is that ambiguous lan-
guage in the insurance contract will be construed against the in-
surer.2 9 This principle is most often justified on the basis that an
insurance company prepares the contract with a background of far
more legal expertise than the average policyholder, who in fact has
no voice in the preparation of the contract.30 However, even where
ambiguous language exists, if the clear intent of the parties with
regard to the specific language can be ascertained this rule may
be avoided by construing the contract in light of the parties actual
intent.31 But if no clear intent can be ascertained, with respect to
the ambiguous language it is still the rule that the construction
of the policy against the insurer must be done fairly and reasonably,
and in a manner consistent with the overall intent of the parties.
82
In other words, this principle may not be applied without restraint.
The third principle to find application is the rule concerning
the construction of exclusionary clauses in insurance contracts.
These exclusionary clauses, like ambiguous language, are strictly
construed against the insurance company. 33 This rule is justified
on the basis that any clause which tends to defeat recovery must
be clearly and unambiguously expressed in the contract.34 Even
though it is the general rule, strict construction may be defeated
by showing a clear intent on the part of the contracting parties
to the contrary.3 5
It must be noted that absent statutory prohibition or a public
policy defense an insurance company, like any other contracting
party, has the right to limit the coverage of a contract to certain
circumstances.36 However, there is a noted tendency of the courts
not to allow a clause in the contract to defeat recovery, if the ob-
jectively reasonable expectations of the insured regarding the terms
of the contract would clearly be to the contrary. 7  This doctrine
is applied even though a literal reading of the clause would defeat
28. E.g., Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J.
511, 525, 193 A.2d 217 (1963); Dinkowitz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 90 N.J.
Super. 181, 184, 185, 216 A.2d 611, 615 (Law Div. 1966); 1 COUCH §§ 15.11,
15.37.
29. 1 CoucH §§ 15.14, 15.73.
30. Id. § 15.80.
31. Id. § 15.82.
32. Id. §§ 15.85, 15.86.
33. Id. § 15.92.
S4. Id.
35. Id. § 15.93.
36. Id. § 15.47. Insurance company's limit their liability on the poli-
cies by the use of requirements provisions which specify when benefits may
be paid and the various exceptions to the policies.
37. Id. § 15.41; KEETON § 6.3; Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Vari-
ance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970).
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recovery and the insured had manifested an informed consent to
the clause when he signed the policy.38 This result is often justified
on the dual grounds of the unequal bargaining power between the
parties and applying the theory of unconscionable advantage, a pro-
cedure frequently followed in dealing with contracts of adhesion. 9
Some courts have construed the term "accident" in light of its
ordinary and popular meaning.40 The theory of unconscionable ad-
vantage is implicit in these decisions. As such an interpretation
of "accident" entails sympathy for the party with little bargaining
leverage, and construction of the contract in his behalf. Stated an-
other way the rationale of this interpretation is that it was the pre-
sumed intent of the parties, unless otherwise manifested, to inter-
pret the terms of the policy in their non-technical, non-legal sense.
41
Other courts, however, have interpreted the term "accident" in light
of its legal definition. 42 As it is presumed under this latter view
that the legal definition was the construction intended by the par-
ties at the time the contract was made, the burden of any variance
between the legal technicalities and the ordinary and popular defi-
nition falls on the insured.
43
Finally, it is important to note that the construction of insurance
contracts is often statutorily regulated. 44 While none of the cases
concerning anaphylactic shock have had occasion to consider a
specific statute, statutory power is generally given to the state in-
surance commissioner to prevent insurance companies from using
unfair, inequitable or misleading language. 45 This power is clearly
38. 1 COUCH § 15.41; KEETON § 6.3; Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at
Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 AINv. L. RE. 961 (1970).
39. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
83 HAny. L. REv. 961 (1970).
40. E.g., Beckham v. Travelers Insurance Co., 424 Pa. 107, 115, 116, 225
A.2d 532, 535, 536 (1967); Burr v. Commercial Travelers Accident Associa-
tion, 295 N.Y. 294, 302, 303, 67 N.E.2d 248, 252 (1946); 1 COUCH § 15.17.
It should be noted that the origin of this position with respect to the
term accidental means is Justice Cardozo's dissent in Landress v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1933).
41. E.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491,
498, 499 (1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
424 Pa. 107, 115, 116, 225 A.2d 532, 535, 536 (1967); 1 COUCH §§ 15.17, 15.20.
42. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S.
491, 496 (1933); Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Galleher, 144 A.2d 550, 552
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958); 1 COUCH §§ 15.17, 15.20.
43. See, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 391 U.S.
491, 496 (1933); Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Galleher, 144 A.2d 550, 552
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958); 1 COUCH §§ 15.17, 15.20.
44. 1 COUCH § 15.2.
45. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 34-18, 35-26, 35-28 (1963); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, §§ 472, 477(b), 1152 (1971). See generally 19 J. APPLEMAN,
INsuRANcE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 10424, 10425 (1946).
relevant to the problems created by the use of ambiguous language
in insurance contracts and should be considered as a possible solu-
tion in this area of insurance law.
C. The Development of the Definition of Accidental Means
A direct correlation exists between a jurisdiction's definition
of the term "accidental means" and the compensability of anaphy-
lactic shock. 46 For this reason it is essential to understand the basic
theories upon which the term "accidental means" has been de-
veloped.
There currently exists conflicting definitions of the term "acci-
dental means" as adopted by numerous jurisdictions. 47 If viewed
along a continuum it would be found most jurisdictions are at either
extreme: the strict or the liberal interpretation, while the few re-
maining jurisdictions are interspersed between the two poles.
In the case of United States Mutual Accident Association v.
Barry45 the United States Supreme Court is recognized as having
originated the strict interpretation of "accidental means." Here
the insured jumped from a platform four feet high and did not
land in the proper manner. He landed heavily on the heels which
caused a stricture of the duodenum, the resulting cause of his
death.4 9 The life insurance policy afforded recovery only if death
was caused by "accidental means."50  In upholding a jury verdict
for the plaintiff-beneficiary the Supreme Court held that the trial
judge correctly instructed the jury that in order to recover under
a policy with a clause predicating the insurance company's liability
upon "accidental means," the claimant must prove that something
unexpected occurred in the act preceding the injury.51 Here the
46. As will be developed in detail in Sections III, IV, and V where
a jurisdiction finds that anaphylactic shock is accidental means recovery
will be permitted. The single exception is Texas where the medical treat-
ment exclusionary clause precluded recovery when the insured died from
an allergic reaction to nitrous oxide administered prior to a tonsillectomy.
International Travelers Ass'n. v. Yates, 29 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930).
47. See, e.g., Beckham v. Travelers Insurance Company, 424 Pa. 107,
225 A.2d 532 (1967); Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
40 N.J. 511, 193 A.2d 217 (1963); 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1221 (1969);
10 CoucH §§ 41.28-41.30; KEEToN § 5.4(3); IvMEYEs § 14.2; Note, Accidental
Means v. Accidental Death or Tweedledum v. Twedledee, 46 N.C.L. REV.
178 (1967); Comment, The Judicial Approach to Accidental Means Policies
in California, 13 HAST. L.J. 255 (1961); Note, Accident and Accidental Means
in Indiana, 36 IND. L.J. 376 (1961); Comment, Accidental Means-A Ser-
bonian Bog in Tennessee, 24 TENN. L. REv. 574 (1956); 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
539 (1960).
48. 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
49. Id. at 103, 104.
50. The policy stated, "Principle sum . . . shall be paid ... [when in-
sured] shall have sustained bodily injuries effected through, external, vio-
lent and accidental means. . . ." Id. at 101.




unexpected manner in which the insured alighted from the plat-
form sufficed.
2
The court employed a literal interpretation of the term "acci-
dental means" which in fact limited the insurance company's lia-
bility to only those instances where an accident occurred in the
means or event which brought about the loss.53 Under this strict
interpretation recovery would be denied where the injury was
merely the unexpected result of an intentional, voluntarily em-
ployed act of the insured.
5 4
This strict interpretation of the distinction between accidental
means and accidental results was reaffirmed by the United States
Supreme Court almost a half century later in Landress v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Insurance Co. 55 There the Court stated:
It is not enough, to establish liability under these clauses,
that the death or injury was accidental in the understand-
ing of the average man .... For here the carefully chosen
words defining liability distinguish between the result and
the external means which produces it. The insurance is not
against an accidental result.
5 6
Adherence to this strict distinction has uniformly resulted in
denying recovery where voluntary, intentional acts of the insured,
properly executed, produced unexpected injuries or even death.
57
The liberal interpretation of "accidental means" was originated
by the celebrated dissent of Justice Cardozo in the Landress case. 8
This dissenting opinion is best recognized for Justice Cardozo's
statement that, "The attempted distinction between accidental re-
sults and accidental means would plunge this branch of the law
into a Serbonian Bog."59  It was implied in the dissent that this
distinction was used by the insurance companies to unconscionably
limit their liability.60 In lieu of the definition of accidental means
52. Id. at 120. See Pope v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 29 F.2d
185, 186 (6th Cir. 1928).
53. See, e.g., Beckham v. Travelers Insurance Company, 424 Pa. 107,
225 A.2d 532 (1967); Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
40 N.J. 511, 193 A.2d 217 (1963); KEErON § 5.4(e); MEYERs § 14.2.
54. MEYRs § 14.2.
55. 291 U.S. 491 (1933).
56. Id. at 495, 496.
57. See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d
55 (8th Cir. 1932); Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Galleher, 144 A.2d 550
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958); KEaTON § 5.4(e); MEYERS § 14.2.
58. 291 U.S. 491, 498 (1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 499.
60. See Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life In-
surance Co., 340 Pa. 533, 17 A.2d 416 (1941); KEurON § 5.4(e); ME-aas §
14.2.
which the majority adopted, Justice Cardozo reasoned that the term
should be interpreted in light of the meaning which the average
policyholder would attach to this language. 61
Unlike the strict Barry-Landress6 2 interpretation of accidental
means which gave effect to the literal meaning of the term, Justice
Cardozo adopted the broader definition afforded by Justice Sanborn
in Western Commercial Travelers Association v. Smith.63 In West-
ern the insured died from blood poisoning caused by an abrasion
of the foot which resulted from the rubbing of new shoes against
the insured's skin.64 The insurance policy contained the standard
"accidental means" clause and the court held the insured died
within the meaning of that clause.65 The court in defining "acci-
dental means" stated,
An effect which is not the natural and probable conse-
quence of the means which produced it, an effect which
does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably antici-
pated from the use of those means, an effect which the
actor did not intend to produce . . . is produced by acci-
dental means.66 (emphasis added)
Where a jurisdiction has followed the lead of Justice Cardozo and
abandoned the distinction between accidental results and accidental
means the limitation that the accident occur in the act preceding
the injury is no longer enforced.67 In fact, under this broader defi-
nition of accidental means if the effect or result was accidental or
would be regarded by the ordinary policy-holder as an accident
then the injury is compensable.6 8 Therefore, even where the means
were voluntary, intentional, and properly performed the mere un-
expected result makes the injury compensable.
The distinguishing element between the strict Barry-Landress69
definition and the Cardozo approach is the manner in which they
treat voluntary and intentional conduct of the insured which pro-
duces unexpected injuries or even death.70 Those jurisdictions ad-
61. Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491, 499
(1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
62. See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra.
63. 85 F. 401 (8th Cir. 1898). This definition of accidental means is
commonly termed the "natural and probably consequences" theory.
Judge Cardozo stated in his dissent, "[t] he principle that should govern
the interpretation of the policy was stated with clarity and precision by San-
born, J. . . ." 291 U.S. 491, 500 (1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
64. Western Commercial Travelers Ass'n. v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 403 (8th
Cir. 1898).
65. ld. at 405, 406.
66. Id. at 405.
67. See, e.g., Beckham v. Travelers Insurance Company, 424 Pa. 107,
225 A.2d 532 (1967); Burr v. Commercial Travelers Accident Association,
295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d 248 (1946); KELroN § 5.4(e); MEYERs § 14.2.
68. MEYRs § 14.2.
69. See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra.
70. Under both theories "involuntary means" as in automobile acci-
dents and falls on stairs, are clearly accidental means. See MEYERs § 14.2.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
hering to the strict rule deny recovery in such instances 71 while
those states adhering to the liberal rule would allow recovery.
2
However, not all jurisdictions adopt one or the other of these defini-
tions, but instead vary their application of the rule with the dif-
ferent factual situations presented. In this regard it was stated by
the New Jersey Supreme Court,
[R] arely has either approach been uniformly applied to all
factual categories in a single jurisdiction ... ; the outcome
of cases which one might think factually analogous, as well
as the legal reasoning used to support the conclusion, varies
not only from state to state but within a state.
73
While anaphylactic shock is uniformly viewed as the unex-
pected results of voluntary, intentional means, the application of
the term "accidental means" has been less precise.74 Some courts
adhere to the two extreme definitions in deciding these cases, but
others are less consistent in their reasoning. Therefore, it is within
this context of the various definitions of "accidental means" that
cases on anaphylactic shock are decided.
III. JURISDICTIONS PERMITrING RECOVERY
Broadly speaking two theories of recovery have been developed
by jurisdictions permitting recovery. The first is a logical applica-
tion of Judge Cardozo's dissent in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life
Insurance Co. 75 As indicated above, 6 this theory requires only that
the effect or the result must be accidental, therefore, voluntary and
intentional means would not preclude recovery.7 7 Jurisdictions
adopting this definition of "accidental means" have permitted re-
covery under this theory because anaphylactic shock is by definition
the unexpected result of intended means.78
The second general theory of recovery is found in various juris-
dictions that have adopted or at least purported to follow the lan-
71. See note 212 infra.
72. See note 106 infra.
73. Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511,
522, 193 A.2d 217, 223 (1963).
74. It should be noted that some older cases imply that mistaken appli-
cation is in itself accidental means and not merely the unexpected result
of intended means. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11
F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 677 (1925); Taylor v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929).
75. 291 U.S. 491, 498 (1933) (Cardozo, J. dissenting).
76. See notes 58-61 and accompanying text supra.
77. See KEErON § 5.4(3); MEYERs § 14.2; notes 67-69 and accompanying
text supra.
78. See note 106 infra.
guage of United States Mutual Accident Association v. Barry7
which, as discussed previously, 0 is the origin of the distinction be-
tween accidental means and accidental results.81 However, these
jurisdictions while drawing this distinction avoid strict application
of the distinction. In so doing they uniformly refuse to adhere to
the strict rule that all voluntarily employed conduct is outside the
coverage of insurance contracts using the term "accidental means."
But when confronted with the issue of defining "accidental means"
in the context of voluntary, intentional conduct which produces un-
expected results these jurisidictions define the term with varying
degree of liberality and consistency.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York r. DodgeS2 was the first signif-
icant case to examine the question of anaphylactic shock and its
coverage by insurance contracts. The death of the insured in this
case resulted from paralysis of the respiratory center caused by the
administration of a local anaesthesia (novocaine) prior to an opera-
tion for the removal of the deceased's tonsils. 83 The evidence indi-
cated that the insured had an "idiosyncrasy or hypersensitivity" to
the drug of which both the doctor and patient were unaware and
which caused the fatal effects.8 4 The policy being sued upon pro-
vided recovery for death by "accidental means" only if it was the
"sole and independent" cause of death and was not within the ex-
clusionary clause for death caused by bodily disease or infirmity.8 5
The court discussed the three primary issues which are cur-
rently considered essential to the proper disposition of anaphylactic
shock cases.8 6 The initial and most important issue was the resolu-
tion of whether anaphylactic shock deaths are within the coverage
of an insurance policy which contracts to pay double the face
amount for death by "accidental means." In the disposition of the
79. 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
80. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
81. 131 U.S. 100, 121 (1889). Accord, e.g., Landress v. Phoenix Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491 (1933); Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424
Pa. 107, 225 A.2d 532 (1967); Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511, 193 A.2d 217 (1963).
82. 11 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925). The
Dodge case is frequently cited under both theories of recovery.
83. Id. at 487.
84. Id.
85. The pertinent provisions of the policy as stated in the opinion were,
... for the payment of double of the face of the policy if death
results, directly from bodily injury .... independently and exclu-
sively of all other causes and if such bodily injury be effected solely
through external violent and accidental means; ... provided, how-
ever, that this double indemnity shall not be payable . . . if death
results . . . directly or indirectly from bodily or mental infirmity
or disease of any kind.
Id. at 487.
86. There is a fourth issue infrequently raised in anaphylactic shock
cases, namely whether the administration of a drug is "medical treatment"




first issue, the court held that a mistaken application of a drug to
a person with an unknown hypersensitivity or idiosyncracy to the
particular drug was death by "accidental means. '8 7 This decision
was rendered in 1926, subsequent to the Barry88 and Western
9
cases but prior to the Landress9" case where the United States Su-
preme Court reiterated the strict distinction between accidental re-
sults and accidental means.9 1 The Dodge court cited with approval
both the Barry and Western decisions which contain conflicting
definitions of the term "accidental means.
92
The attempt to fit the anaphylactic shock case into the strict
definition of "accidental means" enunciated in Barry while permit-
ting recovery was clearly problematic. The conflict engendered by
such a procedure was illustrated in Landress" where the United
States Supreme Court cited with approval the case of Order of
United Commercial Travelers v. Shane94 which specifically held
that mistaken application as used in the Dodge case was not "acci-
dental means."9 5 The Dodge case was cited in Landress as contrary
authority to the strict rule enunciated therein.
96
Jurisdictions which thereafter adopted the strict rule of Lan-
dress had no difficulty finding anaphylactic shock was not acci-
dental means.9 7 However, those jurisdictions which refused to ad-
here to the strict rule had problems reconciling the Dodge case be-
cause it cited with approval authority from both of the divergent
views. The jurisdictions were faced with the conflict of not wishing
87. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486, 488 (4th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925). See also Jensma v. Sun Life
Assur. Co., 64 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 763 (1932).
88. 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
89. 85 F. 401 (8th Cir. 1898).
90. 291 U.S. 491 (1933).
91. For a discussion of these theories see section TIC supra.
92. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486, 488
(4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925).
93. 291 U.S. 491 (1933).
94. 64 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1932). The majority in Landress stated, "The
distinction between accidental external means and accidental result has
been generally recognized and applied where the stipulated liability is for
injury resulting from an accidental external means." 291 U.S. 491, 497
(1933). Following this quote the Shane case was cited with approval. Id.
95. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55, 59 (8th
Cir. 1932).
96. Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 291 U.S. 491, 497
(1933). It should be noted that when Landress was decided the federal
common law prevailed. Because of the subsequent decision in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which abolished the federal common
law the Landress decision is no longer controlling precedent. However, the
reasoning has been influential in many state court decisions.
97. See note 212 and accompanying text infra.
to avoid the import of specific contractual language (accidental
means) but desirous of giving effect to what in the average policy-
holder's opinion must be termed an accident. This conflict set the
arena for the development of the two theories of recovery98 in ana-
phylactic shock.
The second issue considered by the Dodge court was whether
a hypersensitivity to a drug was a bodily disease or infirmity within
the exclusionary clause listed on the policy. The court held that
hypersensitivity to a particular drug was not a bodily disease or
informity but a mere peculiarity.99 The main thrust of their rea-
soning was the testimony of medical experts at trial, but the court
also reasoned that the trial court could have held as a matter of
law that hypersensitivity was not a bodily disease or infirmity.100
Today this position is well recognized and it is rarely an issue in
cases of this nature. 01
The last issue the court considered was the question raised by
counsel for the insurance company that death even if it was caused
by "accidental means" was not the sole and independent cause of
death because the hypersensitivity to the anaesthesia was a con-
tributing or concurring cause. The court by drawing an analogy
to a man with a thin skull who was struck on the head, decided
that as the blow to the head would be the sole cause of death the
mistaken application of the drug was equally the sole cause of
death. 0 2 The court stated, "The idiosyncrasy was but the 'condi-
tion'; the administration of the novocaine was the moving, sole, and
proximate cause of the death."'' 0
A. The Cardozo Theory of Recovery
The strict rule of Landress precluded recovery where un-
expected and unforeseen results were the product of voluntary and
intentional means. 0 4 However, various jurisdictions refused to ad-
here to this strict rule and therefore were required to fashion their
own guidelines with regard to what voluntary acts were within the
definition of accidental means. As a result some jurisdictions found
that leaving this question to a case by case determination produced
inconsistency in their decisions.105 Because the judicial experience
98. These two theories are discussed in detail in sections IIIA and IIIB.
99. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486, 488 (4th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925).
100. Id.
101. See note 18 supra.
102. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486, 488 (4th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925).
103. Id.
104. See KEEToN § 5.4(e); Mrms § 14.2; notes 48-57 and accompany-
ing text supra.
105. These jurisdictions found Justice Cardozo's prediction that the dis-
tinction would plunge this area of the law into a "Serbonian Bog" was true.
291 U.S. 491, 499 (1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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under this distinction proved unwieldy these jursdictions have fol-
lowed the lead of Justice Cardozo and abolished the distinction al-
together. 00
These jurisdictions present the first theory of recovery in ana-
phylactic shock decisions. In these states an injury which results
from the unexpected effect of a voluntary and intentionally ad-
ministered drug is within the coverage of an insurance policy which
requires that death be the result of "accidental means." However,
it should be noted that even though a jurisdiction has abolished
the distinction between accidental means and accidental results its
courts still must determine what is an accident that is compensable
under the policy. Anaphylactic shock, as previously discussed, oc-
106. Kansas: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 158 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.
1946) (Applying Kansas law). See, e.g., Spence v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. Co., 146 Kan. 216, 69 P.2d 713 (1937); Bukata v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 145 Kan. 858, 67 P.2d 607 (1937) (both cases holding there is no distinc-
tion between accidental means and accidental results).
Louisiana: Schonberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 194 So.
2d 171 (1958) (abolishing the distinction between accidental means and ac-
cidental results in an anaphylactic shock case). See, e.g., Murphy v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 269 So. 2d 507, 516, 517 (La. 1972).
Maine: Lee v. New York Life Insurance Co., 319 Mass. 370, 38 N.E.2d
333 (1941) (applying Maine Law). See, e.g., Bouchard v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 135 Me. 238, 194 A. 405 (1937); McGlinchey v. Fidelity and Casualty
Co., 80 Me. 251, 14 A. 13 (1888) (both cases indicate the test for accidental
means is what the average policyholder would define as an accident).
New York: Alderbaum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 859,
19 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1939), affd, 284 N.Y. 695, 30 N.E.2d 728 (1940); Berkowitz
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 10 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1939); Escoe
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 698, 35 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1942);
Denton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1938) (applying New
York law). See, e.g., Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Asso-
ciation, 295 N.Y. 294, 67 N.E.2d 248 (1946) (recognizing that New York has
abolished the distinction); Lewis v. Ocean Accident and Casualty Corp., 224
N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56 (1918); Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
247 App. Div. 378, 287 N.Y.S. 486 (1936), afJ'd, 273 N.Y. 140, 7 N.E.2d 18
(1937).
Utah: Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Co., 39 P.2d 733 (Utah 1935).
See, e.g., Handley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 147 P.2d 319 (Utah 1944); Carter
v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259 (1925); Richards v.
Standard Accident Ins. Co., 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 (1921) (these cases
abolish the distinction between accidental results and accidental means).
It should be noted that in Whatcott the standard accidental means pro-
vision was not construed but instead the policy provided:
The insurance given by this policy is against loss of life... result-
ing from a personal bodily injury which is affected solely and inde-
pendently of all other causes by happening of an external, violent,
and accidental event.
39 P.2d at 734 (emphasis added). The court treated the relationship be-
tween accidental means and event as synonymous to cause and effect.
Therefore the policy only required an accidental result and not accidental
means.
curs so infrequently that some courts find it to be an accident as
a matter of law.10 7 However, other courts have held it is a factual
question based on what the average policyholder would understand
to be an accident. 0 8
Among jurisdictions adhering to the first theory of recovery
New York has produced the most ligitagion on anaphylactic shock.
New York courts have enunciated the following representative defi-
nition of "accidental means: " "Accidental means are those which
produce effects which are not their natural and probable conse-
quences,109 [and] ... a voluntary submission to a means which
produces an unusual effect is also within the definition of accidental
means."" 0 As these jurisdictions adopt such a broad definition of
accidental means the issue of whether anaphylactic shock is acci-
dental means has not been the primary issue under this theory of re-
covery."' Instead, the courts of New York and other similar juris-
dictions have been more concerned with the issue of whether a
hypersensitivity to a drug is a bodily disease or infirmity."
2
The leading case in New York delineating what constitutes a
bodily disease or infirmity is Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.' In this case the insured died from a perforation at the junc-
tion of the stomach and the duodenum which occurred when the
insured fell onto a milk can.11 4 The insured was unaware that he
had a duodenal ulcer which, even though dormant and noninjurious
by itself, caused the wall to perforate because of the lower resist-
ance it provided when there was a blow to the abdomen." 5 Justice
Cardozo speaking for the New York Court of Appeals held that a
107. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 158 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 819 (1948) (applying Kansas law); Lee v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 310 Mass. 370, 38 N.E.2d 333 (1941) (applying Maine law).
108. Schonberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 461, 104 So. 2d 171
(1958); Berkowitz v. New York Life Insurance Co., 256 App. Div. 321, 10
N.Y.S.2d 106 (1939).
109. Burr v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Ass'n, 295 N.Y. 294,
300, 67 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1946).
110. Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 327, 10
N.Y.S.2d 106, 110 (1939).
111. In these jurisdictions the only requirement is that there be an un-
expected result for the injury to be compensable. It is of no consequence
that the means were voluntary and intentional. Because anaphylactic shock
is clearly an unexpected, unforeseen, and unusual occurrence there is not
any doubt that anaphylactic shock meets the jurisdictions definition of acci-
dental means. See Berkowitz v. New York Life Insurance Co., 256 App.
Div. 324, 327, 10 N.Y.S.2d 106, 110 (1939). In Berkowitz the court notes
that insurance counsel did not stress the point whether anaphylactic shock
was accidental means. The main issue was whether hypersensitivity to a
drug was a bodily infirmity. Id.
112. E.g., Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 321, 10
N.Y.S.2d 106 (1939); Escoe v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 698, 35
N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
113. 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930).




dormant duodenal ulcer was not a bodily disease or infirmity.116
The court reasoned that in order to constitute a bodily disease or
infirmity a pre-existing condition must be active and able to cause
harm apart from any other injury inflicted to the insured.117
Following the reasoning of Silverstein the New York courts
have found that a mere hypersensitivity to a drug which results
in the insured's death is not a bodily disease or infirmity.1 8 This
ruling coupled with the broad definition of accidental means
adopted by New York has encouraged suit whenever unexpected
results of surgical procedures produce injury or even death to the
insured. This has in turn forced the courts to define with more
clarity the scope of the exclusionary clause.
Plaintiff's counsel, seeking to avoid the bodily disease and in-
firmity exclusion, treat all unexpected results of surgical proce-
dures as mere hypersensitivities of the insured. Conversely, insur-
ance company counsel seek to expand the scope of the clause by
labeling all pre-existing abnormalities of the insured as bodily in-
firmities. Nonetheless, a close examination of the cases readily
shows the clear distinction drawn in New York between the true
anaphylactic shock cases and litigation which demonstrates the ag-
gressiveness of the plaintiff's bar.
New York has in fact adopted a very narrow definition of what
constitutes a mere hypersensitivity of the insured. In the cases
which allow recovery the insured were all given drugs to effect
medical treatment for the relief of a pre-existing condition. 1 9
Death would not have resulted when it did in any of these cases
except for the fact the insured had an allergy to the specific drug
introduced into his system. The condition that existed in the de-
ceased's body was such that no outside force other than the specific
drug injected into the deceased's body could have caused death. 20
116. Id. at 84, 171 N.E. at 915.
117. Id,
118. Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 321, 10 N.Y.S.2d
106 (1939); Escoe v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 698, 35 N.Y.S.2d
833 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
119. Denton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 556 (D. Md. 1938) (apply-
ing New York law); Alderbaum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 App. Div.
859, 19 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1940), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 695, 30 N.E.2d 28 (1940) (both
cases involved the use of an anaesthetic to perform a tonsillectomy); Berko-
witz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 10 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1939)
(syphillis was the pre-existing disease); Escoe v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
178 Misc. 698, 35 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (pneumonia was the pre-ex-
isting disease).
120. Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 329, 10
N.Y.S.2d 106, 112 (1939).
In order to better direct the energies of counsel in suits of this
nature the court in Escoe v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 2" stated,
"it is seen that the seriousness of the disease is not an important
factor. The controlling element is the seriousness of the risk in-
volved in the therapy." 122 Even where the insured was terminally
ill, if he actually died as a result of a rare reaction to a drug and
not his serious illness, recovery would be permitted.
A comparison of the reasoning in this case with cases that did
not allow recovery further points out the distinction. In Wilson
v. Travelers Ins. Co.123 the court held there was not death by acci-
dental means when the administration of an anesthetic caused pres-
sure to be exerted on an unknown tumor which resulted in cardiac
arrest. 124 This case is distinguishable from those cases allowing re-
covery because here the drug was required to work through an in-
firmity of the insured to effect the unexpected result. Thus while
the infirmity was unknown to both the doctor and the patient and
produced an unexpected result, death did not result from a hyper-
sensitivity to the anesthetic.
Much the same reasoning was employed in Barnstead v. Com-
mercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association of America1 25 where
nitrous oxide administered prior to an operation acted on a condi-
tion of the insured known as status lymphactus to cause death. 26
There was no specific allergy to the nitrous ovide itself but the drug
acted through a disease of the insured to unexpectedly cause his
death.
Therefore, while New York has in fact allowed recovery in ana-
phylactic shock cases, it has narrowly defined the line of cases
which do not constitute bodily diseases or infirmities. The fact a
patient and doctor are unaware the drug may cause an adverse
reaction does not suffice.127 The fact the drug acts on an unknown
disease to cause the insured's death does not entitle the beneficiary
to recover.128 It is clear the unexpected result must be due solely
to a specific allergy to the drug and will not be actionable if it
acts through another unknown condition of the insured.12
Where recovery is allowed in anaphylactic shock cases under
this theory of defining "accidental means" there will be of necessity
litigation on what constitutes a mere hypersensitivity to a drug.
121. 178 Misc. 698, 35 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
122. Id. at 699, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
123. 29 App. Div. 2d 312, 287 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1968).
124. Id. at 315, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
125. 204 App. Div. 473, 198 N.Y.S. 416 (1923).
126. Id. at 474, 198 N.Y.S. at 417.
127. Wilson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 29 App. Div. 2d 312, 287 N.Y.S.2d 781
(1968).
128. Barnstead v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association of
America, 204 App. Div. 473, 198 N.Y.S. 416 (1923).
129. See notes 119 and 120 and accompanying text supra.
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Judging from the New York experience, where the most litigation
has occurred, recovery will be limited to cases that meet these three
tests:
(1) The possibility of adverse reactions to the treatment
when properly administered must be almost negligi-
ble; 180 and,
(2) The adverse reaction must be the result of a specific
allergy to the drug itself and not be the result of the
drug acting through any intermediary condition of the
insured; regardless of how remote the possibility may
be; and regardless of the fact that neither the doctor
nor the patient knew of the intermediary condition; 1 1
and,
(3) The illness which required the insured to be given the
drug must not have contributed to the death of the in-
sured other than placing him in the position to require
the administration of the drug.
8 2
B. The Second Theory of Recovery
The second theory of recovery in anaphylactic shock cases is
found in those jurisdictions which have not abolished the distinc-
tion between accidental means and accidental results. However,
they have nonetheless refused to adhere to the strict interpretation
of Landress that "accidental means" does not include any voluntary
acts of the insured. These jurisdictions each confront the issue by
weighing the import of specific contractual language, namely, "acci-
dental means," against the unfairness of refusing recovery to a
claimant on the basis of a technicality of which he was obviously
unaware. Rather than abolish the distinction, as the jurisdictions
following the Cardozo theory1 3 have done, these jurisdictions per-
ceive that some voluntary acts were meant to be excluded by the
term "accidental means" while others were not. Death induced by
anaphylactic shock has uniformly been recognized by these jurisdic-
tions as death by "accidental means."'1 4 Three of these jurisdic-
130. See notes 121-129 and accompanying text supra.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See note 106 supra.
134. The jurisdictions following this theory that have had cases on ana-
phylactic shock are Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, Michigan and Texas.
The first three are discussed within the text as illustrative of the varied
approaches under this theory but the cases from the latter two are cited
herein.
Texas: International Travelers Ass'n v. Yates, 29 S.W.2d 980 (Texas
1930) (anaphylactic shock was held to be produced by accidental means
but a medical treatment exclusion precluded recovery). See, e.g., Interna-
tions, New Jersey, Minnesota, and Illinois are discussed herein be-
cause of the varied approaches they employ in reaching this result.
1. New Jersey
The case of Korfin v. Continental Casualty Co.' 3 5 decided by
the New Jersey Supreme Court is the controlling precedent on the
issue of whether anaphylactic shock is "accidental means" in New
Jersey. In this case the insured voluntarily took a small pox vac-
cination and death ensued eleven days later from post vaccinal en-
cephelitis, a reaction that sometimes follows the administration of
the vaccine.13 The court held that anaphylactic shock was death
by accidental means.137 The court reasoned that not all voluntary
acts such as taking small pox vaccine are excluded by the term
"accidental means" in insurance contracts and cited Barry'38 for
support of this proposition. 3 9 However, unlike the Dodge140 case
which was decided in 1926, the Korfin court in citing Barry had
the benefit of the 1934 United States Supreme Court decision in
tional Travelers Ass'n v. Francis, 119 Texas 1, 23 S.W.2d 282 (1930); Jones
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 439 S.W.2d 721 (Texas Civ. App. 1969); Hanna v.
Rio Grande National Life Ins. Co., 181 S.W.2d 908 (Texas Civ. App. 1944)
(these cases recognize the distinction but define accidental means as those
which produce effects which are not their natural and probable conse-
quences).
Michigan: Wheeler v. Title Guaranty and Casualty Co. of America, 265
Mich. 296, 251 N.W. 408 (1933) (anaphylactic shock held to be produced
by accidental means). See, e.g., Hoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 266 Mich.
380, 254 N.W. 137 (1934); Ashley v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of America, 241
Mich. 441, 217 N.W. 27 (1928); Wells v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 3
Mich. App. 220, 142 N.W.2d 57 (1966) (these cases define accidental means
in its ordinary and popular sense but require the accident to precede the
injury hence to be in the means).
It should be noted that two decisions interpreting Ohio law on acci-
dental means in anaphylactic shock cases have reached conflicting results.
In Wolfe v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 18 N.W.2d
755 (S.D. 1945), the court held that since Ohio follows the Barry decision
and other jurisdictions following this reasoning have held anaphylactic
shock was produced by accidental means, Ohio would follow suit. Con-
versely, in Bernard v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp. 456 (D.
Mass. 1954), the court held that Ohio like Massachusetts follows the strict
rule and denied recovery.
While Ohio has not had an opportunity to interpret the accidental
means provision in an anaphylactic shock case it is apparent that they fol-
low the strict rule because they cite with approval in various decisions both
the Barry and Landress cases. See, e.g., Hassay v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 140 Ohio 266, 43 N.E.2d 229 (1942); Mitchell v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 136 Ohio 551, 27 N.E.2d 243 (1940); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
Johnson, 91 Ohio 155, 10 N.E. 475 (1914).
135. 5 N.J. 154, 74 A.2d 312 (1950).
136. Id. at 156, 74 A.2d at 313.
137. Id.
138. 131 U.S. 100 (1889). See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra.
139. Korfin v. Continental Casualty Co., 5 N.J. 154, 158, 159, 74 A.2d
312,314 (1950).
140. 11 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925). See
notes 82-96 and accompanying text supra.
Comments
DIC=KISON LAW REVIEW
Landress.141 Landress, as described previously, 142 reaffirmed the
Barry case on the strict interpretation of "accidental means,"
namely that voluntary, intentional means which produce unex-
pected results are not compensable. 43 In fact, as was also previ-
ously discussed, 144 Landress cited with approval Order of Com-
mercial Travelers v. Shane' 45 which specifically held that anaphy-
lactic shock was not accidental means.
146
The courts error in citing Barry for the proposition that in some
instances voluntary conduct which produces unexpected results is
compensable has been impliedly recognized and distinguished by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in two later decisions where the
New Jersey definition of "accidental means" was further developed.
In the cases of Perrine v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,147 and
Linden Motor Freight v. Travelers Ins. Co.148 the court recognized
contrary to the Korfin court that the Barry decision was in fact
the origin of the strict rule later enunciated in Landress. Thus
while these cases did not overturn the Korfin holding they did re-
ject the authority cited to support the holding. Nevertheless New
Jersey does not accept the proposition of Justice Cardozo that the
distinction should be abolished altogether. Instead, New Jersey
does in fact today occupy a middle ground, recognizing the distinc-
tion between accidental results and accidental means but interpret-
ing the term "accidental means" in light of the average policyholder
and thereby permitting some voluntary means to be compen-
sable.149 The rationale for this was stated by Justice Hall in Per-
rine v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, "it [the definition of acci-
dental means] will produce results both fairer to all concerned and
more uniform than either the loose Cardozo or the strict Barry
thesis."'150 Therefore, even though in 1950 the Korfin court pur-
ported to follow the wrong interpretation of Barry as it is now
recognized in New Jersey, it did inferentially adopt the proper
141. 291 U.S. 491 (1933).
142. See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
143. See, e.g., Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 225 A.2d 532
(1967); Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511,
193 A.2d 217 (1963). See notes 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
144. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
145. 64 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1932). See note 94 supra.
146. Order of Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55, 59 (8th Cir.
1932).
147. 56 N.J. 120, 265 A.2d 521 (1970).
148. 40 N.J. 511, 193 A.2d 217 (1963).
149. Perrine v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 56 N.J. 120, 126, 265 A.2d
521, 524 (1970).
150. Id. at 128, 265 A.2d at 525.
standard, namely, that of the average policyholder.' As was
stated in the Linden case, "the court [in Korfin] seems to have
tacitly recognized and quite properly so, that an average policy-
holder would think such an occurrence [anaphylactic shock] within
the reasonable expectation of coverage."' 152 From this analysis it
is therefore clear that anaphylactic shock is produced by "accidental
means" in New Jersey.
The Korfin case only dealt with the issue of anaphylactic shock
and accidental means. However, a clause in the insurance policy
involved also required that the accidental means must be the "sole
and indepndent" cause of death. 53 The failure of counsel for the
insurance company to raise this clause as a defense was questioned
in Mahon v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa.5 4 In this case
the superior court questioned whether hypersensitivity to a drug
was a contributing cause of death which would preclude recovery
under the sole and independent cause provision in the insurance
contract."55 The Mahon court went further to state that a different
result might be achieved where there were both a sole and inde-
pendent cause provision and an exclusionary clause.'56
The possible effect of these questions about the decision in the
Korfin case was extinguished by the decision of Kevit v. Loyal Pro-
tective Life Ins. Co.' 5T In this case the court examined the New
Jersey position on the other two issues which commonly arise in
anaphylactic shock cases, namely concurring or contributing cause
and hypersensitivity as a bodily infirmity under an exclusionary
clause. The New Jersey Supreme Court treated the sole and inde-
pendent cause provision and the exclusionary clause' 58 for bodily
151. Korfin v. Continental Casualty Co., 5 N.J. 154, 159, 74 A.2d 312,
315 (1950).
152. Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511,
523, 193 A.2d 217, 231 (1950).
153. The policy stated, "[i]njury as used in this policy means bodily
injury which is the sole cause of the loss ... ." Korfin v. Continental
Casualty Co., 5 N.J. 154, 156, 74 A.2d 312, 313 (1950). It should be noted
there was no exclusionary clause in the policy.
154. 65 N.J. Super. 148, 160, 167 A.2d 191, 206 (1961).
155. Id. at 160, 167 A.2d at 206. The court stated:
[a]lthough the litigated question Ein Korfinj was whether enceph-
alitis from vaccination was an "accidental means" of death, it is ofinterest that no one raised the question whether the decedent's ap-
parent hypersensitivity of allergy to the vaccine used prevented the
vaccination from being considered the sole cause of death.
Id.
156. Mahon v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa., 65 N.J. Super.
148, 158, 167 A.2d 191, 204, 205 (App. Div. 1961). As previously discussed
the "sole and independent cause" provision in an insurance contract is a
requirement clause that limits the insurance company's liability. See notes
15 and 16 and accompanying text supra. The exclusionary clause referred
to is the provision in insurance contracts which excludes from coverage
deaths caused by "bodily disease or infirmity." See notes 17 and 18 and
accompanying text supra.
157. 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22 (1961).
158. See note 156 supra.
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infirmities synonymously.15 9 In overruling Mahon on this point
the court stated:
We attach little significance to the presence of the exclu-
sionary clause in view of the primary provision limiting
coverage to loss from accidental bodily injuries directly
and independently of all other causes. As the appellate
decision itself recognized in Mahon, the courts' goal in con-
struing an accident insurance policy is to effectuate the
reasonable expectations of the average member of the
public who buys it; he may hardly be expected to draw any
subtle or legalistic distinctions based on the presence or
absence of the exclusionary clause. 160
The Kevit case adopted the reasoning of Justice Cardozo in his
opinion in Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co."6' in defining
what constitutes a bodily infirmity which will amount to a contrib-
uting cause within the meaning of an insurance contract. The Sil-
verstein approach, as previously discussed, has been uniformly in-
terpreted to exclude allergic reactions to drugs as bodily infirmi-
ties.' 62 Even though this specific interpretation has not been made
by the New Jersey courts there is no indication after an examina-
tion of the case law that a contrary decision would result.
Thus, in New Jersey the issues which are pertinent to the dis-
position of anaphylactic shock cases have been decided in favor of
the insured for the following reasons. First, anaphylactic shock
159. Id. at 486, 170 A.2d at 30.
160. Id.
161. 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930). In Klevit the insured was struck
over the head by a "two by four" and developed tremors which led to his
total disability. The defendants claimed the insured had a pre-existing dis-
ease but could not specify it. The court stated:
[w]e are here concerned with a latent, inactive condition or disease
which was not accompanied by any symptoms and which was pre-
cipitated or activated by the accident into a resulting disability; in
comparable situations many courts have sustained recovery on one
justly realistic approach or other, notwithstanding policy provisions
to the effect that the indemnity shall be against loss resulting from
accident, independently of all other causes and not from any disease
or ailment.
Following this statement the court cited Silverstein with approval. Klevit
v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 483, 170 A.2d 22, 27 (1961).
162. Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 10 N.Y.S.2d
106 (1939); Escoe v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 698, 35 N.Y.S.2d
833 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Gyulai v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 135 Pa. Super.
73, 78, 79, 4 A.2d 824 (1938).
It should be noted that in deriving its definition of bodily infirmity
Judge Cardozo, speaking for the Court of Appeals of New York in Silver-
stein, cited with approval both the Dodge case and Taylor v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929) (both anaphylactic shock
cases permitting recovery). Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254
N.Y. 81, 83, 171 N.E. 914, 915 (1930).
has been construed to be "accidental means" within the meaning
of the insurance policy. Second, an exclusionary clause and a "sole
and independent cause" provision will be read synonymously and
interpreted in light of the Silverstein ruling in defining what is
a bodily infirmity and what constitutes a contributing cause. As
Silverstein has uniformly been interpreted to exclude hypersensi-
tivity to drugs from either of these clauses in other jurisdictions,
it is unlikely New Jersey would prohibit recovery based on these
two provisions of an insurance policy.
2. Minnesota
In Minnesota the definition of accidental means" has been
developed inversely to the development in New Jersey. In the pre-
Landress case of Taylor v. New York Life Ins. Co.168 the beneficiary
of a life insurance policy claimed that the insured died by "acci-
dental means" when a local anaesthesia (pure novocaine), properly
administered prior to a. tonsillectomy, caused anaphylactic shock in
the insured.' 4 In finding for the beneficiary, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, like the New Jersey Supreme Court in Korfin,16 5 ex-
pressly rejected the claim of insurance counsel that all voluntary
acts are excluded from coverage by the term "accidental means."'166
But, rather than attempt to fit the anaphylactic shock case into
the Barry67 definition Minnesota adopted the definition of "acci-
dental means" similar to the one enunciated in the Western'6 8 case,
namely, the "natural and probable consequences" theory.', 9  It,
therefore, appeared that when Landress was decided in 1934 Minne-
sota would follow Justice Cardozo's dissent and allow recovery in
line with the jurisdictions classified under the first theory of re-
covery.1 0 In fact, in the 1932 decision of the Minnesota Supreme
Court in the case of Kornschak v. Equitable Life Insurance Society
of the U.S. 1 it was stated, "this court is committed to the more
liberal doctrine that where the death is the unusual, unexpected
or unforeseen result of an intentional act, it occurs by accidental
means."1
72
However, unlike New Jersey which has completely rejected
Barry and moved to a center position on this issue, Minnesota has
163. 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929).
164. Id. at 173, 222 N.W. at 913.
165. 5 N.J. 154, 74 A.2d 312 (1950).
166. Taylor v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 175, 222 N.W. 912,
915 (1929).
167. 100 U.S. 131 (1889). See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra.
168. 85 F. 401 (8th Cir. 1898). See note 66 and accompanying text
supra.
169. Taylor v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 175, 222 N.W. 912,
915 (1929).
170. See note 106 supra.
171. 186 Minn. 423, 243 N.W. 691 (1932).
172. Id. at 423, 243 N.W. at 691.
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left the Cardozo approach and adopted the Barry distinction. In
the case of Gidlund v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees17 decided
in 1941 (post-Landress) by the Minnesota Supreme Court, Judge
Loring, the same judge who wrote the Kornschak opinion nine
years earlier, adopted what was clearly the Barry-Landress distinc-
tion. 17 4 Judge Loring impliedly rejected the reasoning in Korn-
schak and Taylor, by stating:
There are cases holding that where death or injury is un-
foreseen, unexpected, and without design and is not such as
naturally or ordinarily results from the voluntary act of
the insured, the unusual result may be said to constitute
accidental means .... In our opinion these cases stretch
legitimate construction of the contractual language beyond
sound reason.""
Thus the question arises whether Taylor is still a viable deci-
sion in Minnesota. Several factors suggest that this is so. First,
the cases of Gidlund v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees'" and Kluge
v. Benefit of Railway Employees177 which have altered the definition
of accidental means from the Cardozo approach to the Barry-Lan-
dress rule were both cases involving death by heart attack. It is
recognized that deaths due to heart attacks resulting from the in-
sured doing an intentional act such as lifting a heavy object are
treated separately because the average policyholder does not regard
heart attacks as accidental. 178 Secondly, the doctrine of interpret-
ing the insurance contract in light of the average policyholder as
enunciated in Kornschak still prevails in Minnesota.17 9 As previ-
173. 210 Minn. 176,297 N.W. 710 (1941).
174. Id. at 178, 297 Minn. at 711. See Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc.
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511, 193 A.2d 217, 229 (1963).
175. Gidlund v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 210 Minn. 176, 177, 178,
297 N.W. 710, 711, 712 (1941). See, e.g., Kluge v. Benefit of Railway Em-
ployees, 276 Minn. 263, 149 N.W.2d 681 (1967).
176. 210 Minn. 176, 297 N.W. 710. (1941).
177. 276 Minn. 263, 149 N.W.2d 681 (1967).
178. See, e.g., Kluge v. Benefit of Railway Employees, 276 Minn. 263,
149 N.W.2d 681 (1967); Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
40 N.J. 511, 520, 521, 193 A.2d 217, 225, 226, 227 (1963). The Linden court
which did a thorough survey of heart attack cases and accident provisions
of insurance contracts stated:
[I]f we look particularly at the decisions in other jurisdictions
which have dealt with the precise problem before us-the per-
formance of voluntary, intentional physical acts, without anything
unexpected or unforeseen occurring during the course thereof which
result in heart injury by reason of strain or overexertion-we find
that the vast majority deny coverage as a matter of law, no acci-
dental means being found.
40 N.J. 511, 521, 193 A.2d 217, 225 (1963).
179. Kornschak v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S., 186
Minn. 423, 243 N.W. 691 (1932).
ously discussed the uniform result under this doctrine is that ana-
phylactic shock is accidental means.8 0 Finally, the Taylor case is
one of the leading cases on anaphylactic shock and based on the
doctrine of stare decises Minnesota would be unlikely to overthrow
such a long standing precedent. 181
On the other hand it is important to note that Taylor was de-
cided prior to Landress while Gidlund was decided subsequent to
Landress. This might indicate that Minnesota had altered its defi-
nition of accidental means following that ruling by the United
States Supreme Court.8 2 However, if this were the intention of
the court it would have expressly overruled the contrary reasoning
in both Taylor and Kornschak. Therefore, it appears that Gidlund
and Kluge are to be confined to their facts, as merely defining the
"accidental means" of death in heart attack cases. Thus it follows
that anaphylactic shock is an "accidental means" of death in Min-
nesota and therefore covered by insurance policies.8 8
3. Illinois
In Illinois the courts have always purported to follow the
Barry'5 4 case as controlling precedent in defining accidental means.
But, ever since the first Illinois Supreme Court case on the sub-
ject, Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.,1 s5 they have refused
to adopt the rule that all voluntary acts which result in unforeseen
180. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324,
10 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1939); Schonberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 235 La. 351,
104 So. 2d 171 (1958); Korfin v. Continental Casualty Co., 5 N.J. 154, 74
A.2d 312 (1950). See discussion of jurisdictions following this ratio decendi
in note 106 and accompanying text supra.
181. In considering the conflicting definitions of "accidental means" in
Minnesota the New Jersey Supreme Court in Linden Motor Freight v. Trav-
elers Ins. Co., 40 N.J. 511, 193 A.2d 217 (1963), did not attempt to reconcile
them because the court reasoned that Minnesota followed a case by case
interpretation of "accidental means" for each different factual context. This
is consistent with the perpetration of the Taylor rule in Minnesota because
it does not require the courts in that state to reconcile the definition of "ac-
cidental means" used in heart attack cases with the definition used in ana-
phylactic shock cases.
182. See note 96 supra.
183. It should be noted that the Taylor case also examined the issue
of whether hypersensitivity to a drug is a bodily disease or infirmity. The
court reasoned that because the hypersensitivity does not affect the in-
sured's normal life, will not cause him to die earlier except where the drug
is introduced into his body, and does not otherwise interfere with the work-
ings of his body it is therefore a peculiarity and not an infirmity. Taylor
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929). This posi-
tion remains good precedent in Minnesota today. See, e.g., Keller v. Orion
Ins. Co., 422 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1970); Wessel v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.
of America, 361 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1966); Levin v. The Paul Revere Life
Ins. Co., 280 Minn. 301, 151 N.W.2d 186 (1968); Kundinger v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 218 Minn. 273, 15 N.W.2d 487 (1944).
184. 131 U.S. 100 (1889). See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra.
185. 312 Ill. 525, 144 N.E. 161 (1924).
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consequences are excluded from coverage.1 8 6 However, the Illinois
cases decided under this definition are not in complete agreement
on what types of voluntary acts exclude an insured from cover-
age.
1 8 7
The two cases which allow recovery, Vollrath v. Central Life
Insurance Co.' s8 and Schliecher v. General Fire and Life Insurance
Corporation,'8 9 were both decided in the 1920's. In Vollrath the
insured died from his hypersensitivity to the anesthesia (ether)
while being prepared for a tonsillectomy. 19 The appellate court
specifically rejected language to the effect that all voluntarily em-
ployed means which are properly administered are not "accidental
means."'' The court followed this jurisdiction's earlier statement
on the subject, Christ v. Pacific Mutual Insurance Co.,19 2 which
held that not all voluntary acts are excluded from coveage under
the term "accidental means." In Schliecher the insured died from
a rare reaction to nitrous oxide prior to having a tooth extracted. 19 8
This court also realized that Illinois does not follow the strict rule'94
and adopted language similar to that of Western 195 stating:
An effect which is not the natural or probable consequence
of the means which produce it . . . an effect which the
actor did not intend to produce and which he cannot be
charged with the design of producing, is produced by "acci-
dental means." 9
However, an opposite result was reached in another appellate
186. This reasoning is analogous to the two other leading cases on ana-
phylactic shock discussed in this section, namely, Korfin v. Continental
Casualty Co., 5 N.J. 154, 74 A.2d 312 (1950), and, Taylor v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929).
187. Allowing Recovery: Schliecher v. General Accident Fire and Life
Assur. Corp., 240 Ill. App. 247 (1926); Vollrath v. Central Life Ins. Co.. 243
Ill. App. 181 (1926). Denying Recovery: Ebbert v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 289 Ill. App. 342, 7 N.E.2d 336 (1937), aff'd on other grounds, 369 Ill.
306, 16 N.E.2d 749 (1938). See Wayne v. Travelers Ins. Co., 220 Ill. App.
493 (1923) (strong dicta indicates recovery would be denied).
188. 243 Ill. App. 181 (1926).
189. 240 Ill. App. 247 (1926).
190. Vollrath v. Central Life Ins. Co., 243 Ill. App. 181, 183, 184 (1926).
191. Id. at 186. The court specifically rejected the language of Caldwell
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907 (1924), which is recognized
as adopting the strict rule enunciated in Landress.
192. 312 Ill. 525, 144 N.E. 161 (1924); 243 Ill. App. 181, 186 (1926).
193. Schliecher v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 240 Ill.
App. 247, 249, 250 (1926).
194. See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra.
195. 85 F. 401 (8th Cir. 1898). See notes 63-66 and accompanying text
supra.
196. Schliecher v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 240 Ill.
App. 247, 252 (1926).
court case, Ebbert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.197 decided in 1937.
Here the appellate court found that voluntary submission to the
administration of a drug which was properly administered and re-
sulted in the insured's death because of a hypersensitivity to the
drug was not death by accidental means.198 The court relied on
strong dicta in the case of Wayne v. Travelers Insurance Co.199
which adopted the strict rule of defining "accidental means" of
death.
It is important to note that the Wayne case was decided before
the Christ case in which the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the
liberal view of "accidental means" of death.20 0 Thus it would ap-
pear as if the Ebbert court's reliance on any language contained
in the Wayne case was unfounded and clearly in conflict with the
most recent position enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court.
201
Two more recent Illinois cases, Yates v. Bankers Life and
Casualty Co.202 and Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.'
08
support the validity of this conclusion. In Yates the Illinois Su-
preme Court stated:
If an act is performed with the intention of accomplishing
a certain result and if, in the attempt to accomplish that
result another result, unintended and unexpected and not
the natural and probable consequences of the intended act
in fact, occurs, such unintended result is deemed to be
caused by accidental means.
20 4
Clearly this would include anaphylactic shock in the definition of
"accidental means." In Taylor -the court succinctly stated, "In
effect accidental means has been held to be synonymous with acci-
197. 289 Ill. App. 342, 7 N.E.2d 336 (1937), affd on other grounds, 369
Ill. 306, 16 N.E.2d 749 (1938).
198. Id. at 350, 7 N.E.2d at 342.
199. 220 Ill. App. 493 (1923).
200. Christ v. Pacific Mutual Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, 144 N.E. 161 (1924).
The Christ court did not cite the lower court decision in Wayne but adopted
reasoning clearly negating the strict interpretation of the distinction be-
tween accidental results and accidental means. See note 192 supra.
201. The conflict exists even though Ebbert was later affirmed by the
Illinois Supreme Court. When Ebbert was considered the Supreme Court
only affirmed that part of the decision which denied recovery on the basis
that the insured had a pre-existing disease. The correctness of the state-
ment by the appellate court that anaphylactic shock was not accidental
means was not considered. Ebbert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 369 Ill.
306, 309, 16 N.E.2d 749, 751 (1938).
The pre-existing condition of the insured in Ebbert was a liver ailment
that in the opinion of the court contributed to his death. Therefore, recovery
was precluded on the basis of a "sole and independent" cause provision,
and an exclusionary clause for "bodily infirmities." Id. at 313, 16 N.E.2d
at 756.
202. 415 Ill. 16, 111 N.E.2d 516 (1953).
203. 11 Ill. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957).
204. Yates v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 415 Ill. 16, 17-18, 111 N.E.2d
516, 517, 518 (1953).
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dental result .... *,205 This clearly shows Illinois is moving towards
the view expressed by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Landress v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Ins. Co.206
In Carlson v. New York Life Insurance Company,207 the Illinois
appellate court considered what pre-existing illness may, because
of the presence of an exclusionary clause for "bodily disease or in-
firmity" or a "sole and independent cause" provision, preclude re-
covery. The court held that the injury must be the direct and
proximate cause of death before a claim under the policy will be
denied. 208 In making this interpretation the court adopted the
Silverstein20 9 rule which, as previously discussed,2 10 has uniformly
been cited outside the jurisdiction for the premise that hypersensi-
tivity to a drug is not a pre-existing illness or cause which would
relieve the insured of liability. Therefore, the defense available
to an insurance company under either of these clauses would not be
effective in anaphylactic shock cases in Illinois today.
IV. JURISDICTIONs DENYING RECOVERY
The jurisdictions that have denied recovery to persons claiming
under accident provisions of insurance policies for deaths arising
from anaphylactic shock have uniformly adopted the strict distinc-
tion between accidental means and accidental results.211 Volun-
tary, intentional acts which produce unexpected or unforeseen re-
sults are not compensable in these jurisdictions. In an insurance
contract only one provision need be unfulfilled or one exclusionary
requirement be unrealized before recovery will be denied. There-
fore, a jurisdiction which finds that anaphylactic shock is not "acci-
dental means" need not proceed further in the disposition of the
case. The other issues concerning the sole and independent cause
provisions and the exclusionary clause for bodily infirmities and
205. Taylor v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 11 Ill. 2d 227, 142
N.E.2d 5, 6 (1957).
206. 291 U.S. 491, 498 (1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). See Passarella
v. Board of Trustees of the Village of Melrose Park, 106 Ill. App. 2d 448,
245 N.E.2d 913 (1969); Henry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 70 Ill. App. 2d
132, 217 N.E.2d 482 (1966); McAllister v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 68 Inl.
App. 2d 222, 215 N.E.2d 477 (1966); Rodgers v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 8 Ill.
App. 2d 542, 132 N.E.2d 692 (1956).
207. 76 Ill. App. 2d 187, 192, 222 N.E.2d 363, 367, 368 (1966). See, e.g.,
Rebenstorf v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 Ill. App. 71, 84, 85, 19 N.E.2d
420, 425, 426 (1939).
208. 76 Ill. App. 2d at 191, 222 N.E.2d at 367.
209. 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930).
210. See note 162 supra.
211. See notes 48-56 and accompanying text supra.
diseases are not discussed. This is the basic reasoning of all juris-
dictions that have denied recovery.212 Two other jurisdictions,2
18
indicated similar reasoning would be adopted in anaphylactic shock
cases.
A comparison of the leading case which denies recovery, Order
of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane,214 with Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of New York v. Dodge,215 the leading case for allowing recovery,
illustrates the basic distinction between the two positions. Both
cases were decided under the federal common law2 16 and prior to
the United States Supreme Court decision in Landress v. Phoenix
Mutual Life Insurance Co.2 17 Factually the cases are almost identi-
cal. In Shane the insured died immediately following the adminis-
tration of the anaesthetic butyn, a drug having the same charac-
teristics as the novocaine which was administered to the insured
in Dodge.218 In addition, both cases examined most of the issues
that are relevant to the proper disposition of anaphylactic shock
cases today; accidental means, the sole and independent cause pro-
212. District of Columbia: Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Galleher, 144
A.2d 550 (D.C. Mun. Ct. Ap. 1958).
Georgia: Johnson National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 92 Ga. App. 818,
90 S.E.2d 36 (1955). See, e.g., Continental Assurance Co. v. Rothell, 121
Ga. App. 868, 176 S.E.2d 259 (1970) (recognizing the strict rule).
Maryland: John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston v. Plummer,
181 Md. 140, 28 A.2d 856 (Ct. Apn. 1942). See, e.g., Gordon v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 256 Md. 320, 260 A.2d 338 (Ct. App. 1970); Home Beneficial
Life Insurance Co. v. Partain, 205 Md. 451, 106 A.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1954) (both
recognizing the strict rule).
Massachusetts: Bernard v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 117 F. Supp.
456 (D. Mass. 1954) (apnlving Massachusetts law); Lee v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 310 Mass. 370, 38 N.E.2d 333 (1941). See, e.g., Henderson v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 262 Mass. 522, 160 N.E. 415 (1928); Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
219 Mass. 149, 106 N.E. 607 (1914) (both recognizing strict rule).
Indiana: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brunner, 129 Ind. App. 271, 153
N.E.2d 616 (1958). See, e.g., Freeman v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. of
Louisville, 149 Ind. App. 200, 271 N.E.2d 177 (1971); Husbands v. Indiana
Accident Association, 194 Ind. 586, 133 N.E. 130 (1923).
North Carolina: Fletcher v. Security Life & Trust Co., 220 N.C. 148,
16 S.E.2d 687 (1941). See, e.g., Scott v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N.C. 160,
179 S.E. 434 (1935); Mehaffey v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 205
N.C. 701, 172 S.E. 331 (1934) (both recognizing the strict rule).
West Virginia: Otey v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 W. Va.
434, 199 S.E. 596 (1938).
213. Missouri: Caldwell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 305 Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907
(1924); Ward v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 352 S.W.2d 413, 420 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1961) (both recognizing the strict rule).
Washington: McMahan v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 33
Wash. 2d 415, 206 P.2d 292 (1949); Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26
Wash. 2d 594- 174 P.2d 961 (1946); Bennett v. Mutual Trust Life Ins. Co.,
21 Wash. 2d 698, 152 P.2d 713 (1944); Whiteside v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
7 Wash. App. 790, 503 P.2d 1107 (1972).
214. 64 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1932).
215. 11 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925).
216. See note 96 supra.
217. 291 U.S. 491 (1933).
218. 64 F.2d 55, 57 (8th Cir. 1932).
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vision, the exclusionary clause for bodily diseases and infirmities,
and the medical treatment exclusion.
The primary issue the two courts differ upon is of course,
whether anaphylactic shock is "accidental means." This disagree-
ment is primarily centered on their different interpretation of the
language contained in United States Mutual Accident Association
v. Barry219 which states:
If in the act which precedes the injury something unfore-
seen, unexpected, unusual occurs, which produces the in-
jury, then the injury has resulted through accidental
means.220
In Dodge the unintentional application of the drug to a person with
an idiosyncrasy to the particular drug was the "accident preceding
the injury. ' 221 However in Shane the suggestion by plaintiff's
counsel that the idiosyncrasy was part of the means was expressly
rejected.222 This conflict is the essence of the disagreement on the
issue of whether anaphylactic shock is accidental means. Dodge
clearly states there was no intention to give the drug to a person
with an idiosyncrasy hence accidental means. Shane as clearly
states the idiosyncrasy was not part of the means and since the
drug was administered properly there was no accident in the means,
just an accidental result.
223
In addition to disagreeing on the proper interpretation of this
language in Barry, the two courts differ on the importance of the
Western22 4 case where the natural and probable consequence mode
of defining accidental means was enunciated. Both Dodge and
Shane cite it with approval as supporting their result, but in Shane
the court confined it to its facts which the court stated were not
opposed to denying recovery. 225 In fact the Shane court did not
use the Western case to define what was accidental means but
rather employed the strict interpretation of the distinction between
219. 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
220. Id. at 121.
221. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486, 488 (4th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925).
222. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55, 58 (8th
Cir. 1932).
223. Because some jurisdictions adhere to the Dodge logic (see notes 106
and 134 accompanying text supra) and others adhere to the logic of
Shane (see note 212 and accompanying text supra) the outcome of cases
that are actually identical may depend on the jurisdiction in which the in-
surance contract was formed.
224. 85 F. 401 (8th Cir. 1898). See notes 63-66 and accompanying text
supra.
225. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55, 59 (8th
Cir. 1932).
accidental results and "accidental means.' '226 The Dodge court ac-
tually used the Western case to define accidental means thereby
extending the principles of the case beyond its facts.22 7 Thus, the
two positions are characterized by their conflicting interpretations
of the language in Barry and the impact the Western case has on
their definition of accidental means.
Even though later cases denying recovery merely rely on the
fact anaphlyactic shock is not an "accidental means," it should be
noted that the Shane court held that where death results from an
idiosyncrasy of the insured then the administration of the drug is
not the sole cause of death.228 Therefore recovery could also be
denied under the sole and independent cause provision of the insur-
ance policy. This directly conflicts with the reasoning in Dodge
where it was held the idiosyncrasy was but the condition of the
insured and the administration of the drug was the sole and
proximate cause.220 Due to the inherent nature of insurance con-
tracts, the only jurisdictions where this issue has been considered
are those which find anaphylactic shock is "accidental means."
They have uniformly found through various arguments that hyper-
sensitivity to a drug is not a contributing or concurring cause.
23 0
Another potential barrier in those jurisdictions denying re-
covery is the exclusionary clause prohibiting recovery for injuries
arising from medical treatment.221 While it has very rarely been
an issue it has almost uniformly resulted in denying recovery to
anaphylactic shock victims.2 32 The justification for the results have
been that the administration of a drug for the purpose of anesthe-
sizing the insured, or prior to any other medical treatment is part
of that treatment.22 3 Recovery was denied on this basis in Shane
226. Id.
227. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486, 488 (4th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925).
228. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55, 58 (8th
Cir. 1932).
229. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486, 488 (4th
Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 677 (1925).
230. Vollrath v. Central Life Ins. Co., 243 Ill. App. 181 (1926); Taylor
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912 (1929); Berkowitz
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 10 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1939); Gyulai
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 135 Pa. Super. 73, 4 A.2d 824 (1938).
231. See note 19 supra.
232. Denying Recovery: Order of United Commercial Travelers v.
Shane, 64 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1932); Westmoreland v. Prudential Accident
Ass'n, 75 F. 244 (N.D. Ga. 1896); International Travelers Ass'n v. Yates,
29 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930). See also Wilson v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
29 App. Div. 2d 312, 287 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1968). Allowing Recovery: Beile
v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 155 Mo. App. 629, 135 S.W. 497 (1911) (the
definition of accidental means adopted here was reversed; therefore, recov-
ery in anaphylactic shock was denied. Caldwell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 305
Mo. 619, 267 S.W. 907 (1924)).
233. In International Travelers Ass'n v. Yates, 29 S.W.2d 980, 981 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1930), the court stated:
[t]he average layman would refer to a death under an anaesthetic
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where the policy stated, "[Insurer] shall not be liable to any person
for any benefit for any death. . . resulting from. . . medical, me-
chanical or surgical treatment .... ",284 Recovery has also been
denied on this basis where the court found anaphylactic shock was
"accidental means.' ' 235
While it is not argued that the administration of a drug to the
insured is not medical treatment, it appears that giving effect to
these clauses to preclude recovery in anaphylactic shock cases de-
feats the inherent purposes of the insurance contract. The insured
contracts with the insurance company to protect him and his family
from unforeseen consequences which result in bodily injury or even
the death of the insured. Medically, anaphylactic shock is clearly
an accident, it occurs unpredictably and infrequently. 28 6 In addi-
tion the insured's death occurs solely because of the unexpected
allergic reaction and not due to any active disease which the insured
might possess. This is clearly distinguishable from those cases
where the insured unexpectedly dies during medical treatment, but
the cause of death is the disease which induced the treatment. The
latter situation, is more within the meaning of the medical treat-
ment exclusion as intended by the insured. But to apply the exclu-
sion to prohibit recovery in anaphylactic shock cases where the in-
sured's death was caused solely by an unpreventable, unpredictable
occurrence deprives the policyholder of the benefits for which he
purposely acquired the policy.
While the literal interpretation of the medical treatment exclu-
sionary clause may defeat recovery in anaphylactic shock cases, the
objectively reasonable expectations of the insured would clearly be
to the contrary. Recovery may therefore be justified on the basis
of unequal bargaining power between the parties or unconscionable
advantage on the part of the insurer to limit liability beyond the
reasonable expectations of the average policyholder.28 7
preparatory to an operation as one where the patient died as the
result of an operation. This would be because the administration
of an anaesthetic is commonly regarded as a proper and necessary
part of a surgical operation.Id.
234. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shane, 64 F.2d 55, 56 (8th
Cir. 1932). Of course, recovery was also denied because anaphylactic shock
did not constitute accidental means. In addition, the court found the hyper-
sensitivity was a contributing cause. Id.
235. International Travelers Ass'n v. Yates, 29 S.W.2d 980, 981 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1930).
236. See notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra.
237. See, e.g., 1 CoucH § 15.41; KELroN § 6(b); Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HAsv. L. REv. 961 (1970).
V. TnE PENNSYLVANIA EXPERIENcE
In Hesse v. Travelers Ins. Co. 28 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court by a vote of four to three held that death which resulted
from hypersensitivity to an anaesthetic was not within the limits of
coverage afforded the insured under a policy which protected him
against, "bodily injuries, effected, directly and independently of all
other causes, through external violent and accidental means."23 9 In
this case the insured was administered an anaesthetic prior to an
operation for the removal of one of his kidneys. No complaint was
made that the operation was not skillfully performed or that the
anaesthetic was not properly administered. 240 The insured died be-
fore the surgery was completed from what the doctors termed
anaesthetic death, and which they defined as "hypersensitivity of
the particular individual to the particular anaesthetic. 241 Neither
the patient nor the doctors were aware of the patient's hypersensi-
tivity to the anaesthetic. The courts reasoning was twofold. First,
it was held there was no "accidental means" as required by the
insurance contract.242 It was the law of Pennsylvania at that par-
ticular time to recognize the strict distinction between accidental
means and accidental results, and consistent with this strict rule
the Pennsylvania courts found that a voluntary, intentional act
which brings about an unintended result was not "accidental
means" as it was employed in insurance contracts.248 Applying
this interpretation of "accidental means" to anaesthetic death, the
Hesse court stated, "there was no accidental means, all those em-
ployed were intentional."'244 Second, the court held that the in-
sured's hypersensitivity to the anaesthetic was the effective cause
or at least a contributing cause of death, therefore, death was not
effected solely and independently of all other causes as required by
the insurance policy.
245
The Hesse result, that anaphylactic shock was not "accidental
means", was based on the strict distinction between accidental
means and accidental results.2 46  However, in 1967 the Pennsyl-
238. 299 Pa. 125, 149 A. 96 (1930).
239. Id. at 129, 149 A. at 97.
240. Id. at 128, 149 A. at 97.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 129, 149 A. at 97. The court also questioned whether there
was a "bodily injury." Id. However, no other anaphylactic shock case has
made this inquiry or even questioned that there was not a bodily injury.
If this question were raised today there is little doubt anaphylactic shock
would be a "bodily injury." See MEYEs § 14.3.
243. Frame v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 358 Pa. 103, 56 A.2d 76
(1948); O'Neill v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 345 Pa. 158, 26 A.2d 898 (1942);
Arnstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 329 Pa. 158, 196 A. 491 (1938); Urian
v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., 310 Pa. 342, 165 A. 388 (1933); Pollack v.
United States Mutual Accident Association, 102 Pa. 230 (1883).
244. Hesse v. Travelers Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125, 129, 149 A. 96, 97 (1930).
245. Id. at 129, 130, 149 A. at 97.
246. See note 243 supra.
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vania Supreme Court in the case of Beckham v. Travelers Insurance
Company247 reversed this long standing precedent in favor of the
approach taken by Justice Cardozo in his celebrated dissent in the
Landress case, namely, to abolish the distinction between accidental
results and accidental means. The Beckham court stated:
Rather than continue upon our present course we prefer to
confront the issue directly and abandon the artificial dis-
tinction between accidental means and accidental results.
Continued adherence to this distinction would not only fail
to serve a useful purpose but would condone ambiguity in
a context in which we have traditionally insisted upon
clarity and precision.
248
The Beckham court cited Hesse as adding to this confusion by
contrasting the result in Hesse to another Pennsylvania case, Urian
v. Equitable Life Insur. Soc'y.24  In Urian the insured was killed
by carbon monoxide gas while at work in his garage and the court
permitted recovery.2 50 The Beckham court implied that similar re-
sults were warranted and under the new definition of accidental
means such would be the outcome. 251 Therefore, the court in effect
questioned without overruling the Hesse decision in light of the
ruling adopted in the Beckham case.
From the Beckham decision it is clear the current Pennsylvania
law would allow recovery under the definition of accidental means
when an intentional act properly performed produced an unex-
pected injury to the insured.25 2 However, to fill the void in de-
fining what voluntary, intentional acts are "accidental means" the
court adopted the average policyholder's opinion as the yardstick
on this question.253 Judging by the uniformity in other jurisdic-
tions, which employ a similar definition of "accidental means," and
hold that anaphylactic shock is a compensable voluntary act, there
247. 424 Pa. 107, 225 A.2d 532 (1967).
248. Id. at 115, 225 A.2d at 535.
249. 310 Pa. 342, 165 A. 388 (1933). See Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
424 Pa. 107, 114, 225 A.2d 532, 535 (1967).
250. Urian v. Equitable Life Assur. Co., 310 Pa. 342, 344, 345, 165 A.
388, 389 (1933).
251. Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 114, 225 A.2d 532, 535
(1967).
252. See discussion of jurisdictions abolishing the distinction between
accidental results and accidental means, notes 58-68 and accompanying text
supra.
253. Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 Pa. 107, 115, 116, 225 A.2d 532,
535, 536 (1967). The court adopted the reasoning of Mansbacher v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America, 247 App. Div. 378, 297 N.Y.S. 486, aff'd, 273 N.Y.
140, 7 N.E.2d 18 (1937), which uses the average policyholder as the defini-
tion of accident in New York. See note 97 supra.
is little doubt Pennsylvania would reach an identical conclusion.254
Therefore, such part of the reasoning in the ,tIesse case which
denied recovery because anaphylactic shock was not "accidental
means" has been effectively overruled in Pennsylvania.
The second significant aspect of the Hesse court's reasoning was
the finding that the hypersensitivity to the anaesthesia is a con-
tributing cause of the insured's death, and hence, even if there had
been an accident it could not have been the direct and independent
cause of death. 25 5 In light of the Pennsylvania cases decided subse-
quent to Hesse, which examine the effect of a pre-existing disease
of the insured on recovery under accident provisions of insurance
contracts, this premise of the Hesse case is no longer tenable. In
fact Hesse was denied very early in the development of this area
of the law in Pennsylvania which has since undergone substantial
revision and refinement.
The insurance contract in Hesse, unlike most insurance con-
tracts today with accident provisions, did not contain an exclusion-
ary clause for death directly or indirectly caused by bodily disease
or infirmity.256 These clauses have the obvious purpose of limiting
the insurance company's liability and this distinction between poli-
cies which have this exclusionary clause and those which do not
is important in defining the scope of this liability. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Real Estate Trust Company of Philadelphia
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.2 57 recognized that where an insurance
contract contains only the direct and independent cause provision
the accident merely must be the proximate or predominant cause
of the insured's death or injury. 25 8
The Hesse court in denying recovery interpreted this rule to
require the insurance company to be able to ascertain the disease
or infirmity of the insured which contributed to his death, other-
wise no liability would be imposed. 259 However, no other court
254. See discussion of jurisdictions adopting this definition of accidental
means in section IIIA supra. See note 106 supra.
255. Hesse v. Travelers Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125, 129, 130, 149 A. 96, 97
(1930).
256. This was recognized in Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 340 Pa. 533, 541, 17 A.2d 416, 420 (1941).
257. 340 Pa. 533, 17 A.2d 416 (1941).
258. Id. at 541, 17 A.2d at 420. See Note, The Effect of a Pre-Existing
Disease on the Right to Recover Under an Accident Policy or the Double
Indemnity Provision of a Life Insurance Policy, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 853, 859,
860 (1938).
259. Hesse v. Travelers Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 125, 129, 130, 149 A. 96, 97
(1930). This reasoning was used to circumvent an earlier Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court decision, Kelly v. Pittsburgh Casualty Co., 256 Pa. 1, 100 A.
494 (1917), which originated the "proximate and predominant rule" used
to interpret the direct and independent cause provision found in insurance
contracts. See Note, The Effect of a Pre-Existing Disease on the Right to
Recover Under an Accident Policy or the Double Indemnity Provision
a Life Insurance Policy, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 853 (1938).
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which has interpreted this rule has subsequently made this distinc-
tion which appears artificial and contrary to the inherent purpose
insurance policies serve, namely, protecting against unknown risks.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in fact downgrade the
importance of the Hesse decision on this specific point in the Real
Estate Trust case. The court reviewed the entire history of the
law in this area in Pennsylvania and while noting Hesse was only
the second case to reach it for consideration on this issue, it em-
phasized that the real question in Hesse was not the contributing
cause element but the accident element.
26 0
Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court clarified its position
on pre-existing diseases of the insured and accident clauses in insur-
ance contracts in Real Estate Trust, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court had occasion in the companion cases of Gyulai v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America26 1 and Guylai v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
2 62
to rule on the question of whether a hypersensitivity to a drug
was a defense where recovery was sought under insurance contracts
both with and without exclusionary clauses. The court held in both
instances that where an accident, in this case a board falling on
the head of the insured, places the insured in a position to require
the administration of a drug to which he was unknowingly hyper-
sensitive, and the insured dies as a result of the hypersensitivity,
the hypersensitivity is neither a contributing cause of the death,
nor a bodily infirmity of the insured.263 Because there was an inci-
dent preceding the administration of the drug which was clearly
an accident, the Gyulai cases are distinguishable from the Hesse
case.2 6 4 But, nevertheless the principles applied in analyzing the
effect of hypersensitivity to drugs in accident clauses of insurance
260. Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
340 Pa. 533, 539, 540, 17 A.2d 416, 419 (1941).
261. 135 Pa. Super. 73, 4 A.2d 824 (1938).
262. 135 Pa. Super. 82, 4 A.2d 828 (1938).
263. Gyulai v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 135 Pa. Super. 73, 82, 4
A.2d 824, 827 (1938); Gyulai v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 135 Pa. Super.
82, 88, 4 A.2d 828, 830 (1938).
264. In Gyulai the insured was accidentally hit over the head by a
board. The issue in the case was not whether anaphylactic shock was acci-
dental means but whether a hypersensitivity to a drug was a contributing
cause of the insured's death. However this case is distinguishable from
Hesse because unlike Hesse where recovery was precluded because the hy-
persensitivity contributed to the insured's death, this court states:
[E]ven if it be conceded that the insured's death would not have
resulted from the injury inflicted upon his head if he had not been
hypersenaitive to the effects of the injection, it does not follow that
there can be no recovery.
135 Pa. Super. 73, 78, 4 A.2d 824, 825 (1938) (emphasis added).
contracts were subsequently cited with approval by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in the Real Estate Trust case.2 6
5
In deriving its holding the superior court recognized that
Pennsylvania had adopted the definition of bodily infirmity enunci-
ated by Judge Cardozo in Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 266
This view recognized that:
A policy of insurance is not accepted with the thought that
its coverage is to be restricted to an Apollo or a Hercules
. . . [but] a distinction is to be drawn between a morbid or
abnormal condition. . . and a condition. . . so remote in its
potential mischief that common speech would call it not
disease or infirmity .... 267
The superior court reasoned that a jury could find that hypersensi-
tivity to a drug was not a bodily infirmity because of the infre-
quency with which it occurs and because it merely reflects a low-
ered resistance in the insured, not a morbid disease.268
Apparently insurance companies became dissatisfied with the
results in Pennsylvania under the proximate and predominant26 9
cause rule and, therefore, included the exclusionary clause for
bodily diseases and infirmities in their insurance contracts with ac-
cident provisions. This was an obvious attempt to limit their lia-
bility and was given effect as such by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court on various occasions. 270 A specific rule was developed to
differentiate the insurance companies' liability on policies with and
without this exclusionary clause in light of a provision that the
accident be the direct and independent cause of death:
Where the liability of the insurance carrier is so restricted,
it is not sufficient for the insured to establish a direct
causal relation between the accident and the loss of dis-
ability. He must show that the resulting condition was
caused solely by external and accidental means, and if the
proof points to a pre-existing infirmity or abnormality
which may have been a contributing factor, the burden is
upon him to produce further evidence to exclude that possi-
bility.2
7'
265. Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
340 Pa. 533, 542, 17 A.2d 416, 420 (1941).
266. 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 (1930). This rule was by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in the case of Arnstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
345 Pa. 158, 26 A.2d 898 (1942). The Gyulai court had previously applied
the Silverstein definition of what constitutes a bodily infirmity. Gyulai v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 135 Pa. Super. 73, 78, 79, 80, 4 A.2d 824,
825,826 (1938).
267. Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N.Y. 81, 82, 83, 171
N.E. 914, 915 (1930).
268. Gyulai v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 135 Pa. Super. 73, 79, 80,
4 A.2d 824, 826, 827 (1938).
269. See note 259 supra.
270. SeeKEETON § 5.4(e); MEYERs § 14.2.
271. Lucas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 277, 280, 14 A.2d 85,
86 (1940); see McGarity v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 Pa. 308, 59 A.2d
47 (1948); Frame v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 358 Pa. 103, 56 A.2d
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But the right to recover was barred only if there was in fact such
a contributing cause, not if it was merely speculated that the pre-
existing condition contributed to the insured's death.2 72
A later decision, Brenneman v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 2713 altered the burden of proof with regard to the contributing
cause element but did not change the limits on the insurer's liability
provided by the clause. 274 In Brenneman the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that the claimant must first prove a bona fide
accident and a causal connection between the accident and the
death of the insured.27 5 But, unlike before, the burden then shifted
to the insurance company to prove the effect, if any, of a pre-exist-
ing condition of the insured upon his subsequent death.27 6
In defining what pre-existing conditions of the insured will pre-
vent recovery under this rule the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
clearly followed the principles previously stated in the Gyulai
cases.2 7 The policy in adopting this approach was to limit the lia-
bility of the insurance company beyond what was provided by the
proximate and predominant278 rule but not to defeat the entire pur-
pose of the accidental death provision by providing that every con-
dition of the insured which related to the injury would preclude
recovery. 79 While no subsequent cases have considered this rule
with regard to an insured's hypersensitivity to a drug, it appears
that the decision in GyuZai based on the principles similar to those
finding application in this rule would require a result identical to
76 (1948); Rodia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 354 Pa. 313, 47 A.2d 152
(1946); Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
340 Pa. 533, 17 A.2d 416 (1941); Roeper v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 138 Pa.
Super. 283, 11 A.2d 184 (1940).
272. Frame v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 358 Pa. 103, 108, 56 A.2d
76, 78 (1948).
273. 411 Pa. 409, 192 A.2d 745 (1963).
274. Id. at 415, 192 A.2d at 748.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
340 Pa. 533, 17 A.2d 416 (1941). See, e.g., Frame v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 358 Pa. 103, 56 A.2d 76 (1948); Rodia v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 354 Pa. 313, 47 A.2d 152 (1946); Lucas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
339 Pa. 277, 14 A.2d 85 (1940).
278. See note 259 supra.
279. See Rodia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 354 Pa. 313, 47 A.2d 152
(1946); Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
340 Pa. 533, 17 A.2d 416 (1941); Lucas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339
Pa. 277, 14 A.2d 85 (1940); Roeper v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 138 Pa. Super.
283, 11 A.2d 184 (1940); Note, The Effect of a Pre-Existing Disease on the
Right to Recover Under an Accident Policy or the Double Indemnity Pro-
vision of a Life Insurance Policy, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 853 (1938).
Gyulai, namely, that a hypersensitivity to a drug will not preclude
recovery under an insurance contract with these two clauses.
The cases interpreting these clauses which have denied re-
covery all involve pre-existing diseases of the insured that were
active before the accident. For example, where the accident pro-
duced gangrene of a diabetic character, the fact the insured was
suffering from diabetes at the time of the accident prevented re-
covery. 280 Arteriosclerosis not consistent with the age of the in-
sured was held to be a pre-existing disease of the insured that pre-
vented recovery.28 ' A nervous condition of the insured which had
dissipated prior to the accident but recurred following the acci-
dent was held to be a pre-existing disease that precluded recov-
ery. 28 2 But conditions which are inherent in the age of the insured
or mere weaknesses or lower resistances of the insured to outside
forces will not prevent recovery.
2 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in deciding these cases has
always treated the two clauses synonymously. 284 The pre-existing
condition of the insured when examined under the exclusionary
clause is also treated as that condition which allegedly contributed
to the death of the insured, thereby preventing the accident from
being the sole and independent cause of death as required by the
policy. The exclusionary clause, as previously stated, is viewed as
a specific limitaion on the broader sole and independent cause pro-
vision. Therefore, the courts have implied that if a pre-existing
condition does not fall within the exclusion it is a fortiori, not a
contributing cause of the insured's death.2 5 Under this mode of
interpreting the two clauses and the principles applied to define
the insurers liability, it is apparent that the reasoning in the Hesse
case, which held that hypersensitivity to a drug was a contributing
cause of the insured's death, has been effectively overruled by sub-
sequent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
280. Roeper v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 138 Pa. Super. 283, 11 A.2d 184
(1940).
281. Rodia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 354 Pa. 313, 47 A.2d 152 (1946).
282. Lucas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 339 Pa. 277, 14 A.2d 85 (1940).
283. See Frame v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 358 Pa. 103, 56
A.2d 76 (1948); Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 340 Pa. 533, 17 A.2d 416 (1941); Kelley v. Prudential Insurance
Co., 334 Pa. 143, 6 A.2d 55 (1917); Arnstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
329 Pa. 158, 196 A. 491 (1938); Gyulai v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
135 Pa. Super. 73, 4 A.2d 824 (1938).
284. See, e.g., McGarity v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 Pa. 308, 59 A.2d
47 (1948); Rodia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 354 Pa. 313, 47 A.2d 152
(1946); Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
340 Pa. 533, 1 7A.2d 416 (1941).
285. See, e.g., Frame v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 358 Pa. 103, 56
A.2d 76 (1948); Rodia v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 354 Pa. 313, 47 A.2d
152 (1946); Real Estate Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Metropolitan Life Ins.




There is a conflict among the states on the issue of whether
injuries or deaths which result from anaphylactic shock are com-
pensable under an accident insurance policy or the double indem-
nity provision of a life insurance policy. The direct cause of the
split of authority is the conflicting manner in which the various
jurisdictions interpret the provision in these policies which requires
the bodily injury or death to be effected through "accidental
means.
286
Basically three interpretations of the term, "accidental means,"
have developed. The first and most liberal was enunciated by Jus-
tice Cardozo in his dissent in Landress v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
Co.2'7 This theory defines accidental means in light of what the
average policyholder would determine constitutes an accident in the
ordinary and popular use of the term.28 Because anaphylactic
shock is an event that may occur once in one hundred thousand
administrations of the drug it is clearly viewed as an accident by
the average policyholder. 2 9 Jurisdictions adopting this definition
have, therefore, uniformly held anaphylactic shock is "accidental
means" and permitted recovery.
290
A second and totally opposite definition of "accidental means"
is the strict rule enunciated in United States Mutual Accident
Ass'n. v. Barry 29 ' which was reaffirmed by the United States Su-
preme Court in Landress.292 Under the strict rule the requirement
in the insurance policy that bodily injury or death occur through
"accidental means" is given legal meaning apart from the ordinary
use of the term accident.29 3 States adopting this rule view the use
of the specific language, "accidental means," as an attempt by the
insurance company to limit its liability and give it effect accord-
ingly.
294
Adherence to the strict rule uniformly requires an unexpected,
unusual or unforeseen event occur in the act preceding the injury.
It is not sufficient that only the result was unexpected; there must
286. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
287. 291 U.S. 491, 498 (1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
288. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
289. Berkowitz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 256 App. Div. 324, 327, 10
N.Y.S.2d 106, 109, 110 (1939). See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
290. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
291. 131 U.S. 100 (1889).
292. 291 U.S. 491 (1933). See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
293. See notes 42, 43 and accompanying text supra.
294. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
be an accident in the means which caused the injury. 295 Therefore,
these jurisdictions do not consider death or injuries which result
from voluntary, intentional acts, properly conducted, as consti-
tuting "accidental means. '298 Because anaphylactic shock is clearly
the unexpected result of voluntary, intentional acts on the part of
the insured, jurisdictions adhering to the strict rule hold anaphylac-
tic shock is not produced by "accidental means" and therefore deny
recovery.
29 7
Faced with the conflict of desiring to give effect to the use
of specific language ("accidental means") by the insurer yet under-
standing that the average policyholder would not comprehend the
legal implications, numerous jurisdictions have adopted a middle
ground.298  These jurisdictions, unlike those adopting the strict
rule, have held that not all voluntary, intentional conduct which
produces unexpected injuries or even death are automatically non-
compensable due to the use of the term "accidental means" in insur-
ance contracts. Conversely, however, not every unexpected result
is within the definition of "accidental means" as it is more liberally
defined under the first theory. While jurisdictions adhering to this
less definable middle ground have often been criticized because of
inconsistent results in analogous factual situations, they have none-
theless uniformly held that anaphylactic shock was produced by
accidental means and permitted recovery.
299
Two other clauses have frequently been the basis of defenses
by insurance companies in anaphylactic shock cases. The first is
the provison which requires the accident to be the sole and inde-
pendent cause of the insured's death, and the second is the exclu-
sionary clause which prohibits recovery if the insured's death is
contributed to by a bodily disease or infirmity. 00 Where the two
clauses are both present they are treated synonymously because
they speak to the same argument in anaphylactic shock cases. It
is the contention of the insurers that the insured's hypersensitivity
to the drug was a bodily infirmity which contributed to his death
and recovery should, therefore, be denied. 0 1 However, except for
a few older decisions, it has uniformly been held that hypersensi-
tivity to a drug does not constitute a bodily infirmity which con-
tributed to the insured's death.
80 2
In conclusion, of the three theories which have been developed
295. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. Compare this require-
ment to the first interpretation of "accidental means" where only an acci-
dental result must occur.
296. Id.
297. See note 212 and accompanying text supra.
298. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
299. Id.
300. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
301. Id.
302. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
Comments
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in defining "accidental means" only the strict interpretation has
precluded recovery in anaphylactic shock cases. However, for-
tunately for the policyholder the trend has been to repudiate the
strict rule in favor of a broader definition of the term. 03 Jurisdic-
tions formerly adhering to the strict rule have found that giving
a legal interpretation which substantially differs from the ordinary
and popular meaning of the term "accidental means" has often pro-
duced inequitable results3 04 A policyholder finds that his concep-
tion of what constitutes an accident at the time the contract was
made suddenly differs, to his detriment, from the interpretation
rendered by a court. Nowhere are the inequities of this rule more
pointed than in the context of anaphylactic shock cases, and con-
tinued adherence would only serve to perpetuate this unfairness.
BRUCE A. OLSTEa
303. KErEON§5.4(e);MEYERs § 14.2.
304. See notes 106, 134 and accompanying text sulpra.
